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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Utah Career
Service Review Board

(CSRB), an agency of state government.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court under Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-6 (1993) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1994).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
A formal evidentiary hearing was held pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 67-19a-404, 405, and 406 (1992) before a CSRB hearing
officer appointed pursuant to section 404.

The hearing officer

held a multi-day hearing beginning on August 11, 1992 and concluding April 12, 1993.

Thereafter the hearing officer rendered a

decision which consisted of his findings of fact, conclusions of
law and a discussion of his decision (R.8-26).

The Department of

Corrections (Corrections) appealed the hearing officer's decision
to the CSRB pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-407 (1992).

The

Career Service Review Board issued its decision on February 23,
1994

(Addendum E, Corrections Addenda volume accompanying its

brief, R.91-124).

Corrections thereafter filed its appeal with

this court.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the CSRB act within its statutory authority in

requiring an evidentiary hearing in this matter and relying on its
hearing officers findings of fact as the official record of the
hearing and not giving deference to Corrections' findings of fact?
An agency's interpretation or construction of general law is
reviewed without deference to the agency but is viewed on a
correctness standard.

Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814

P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991).

An agency's application of its own

rules is reviewed in an intermediate standard of reasonableness and
rationality. Holland v. Career Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678
(Utah App. 1993).
2.

Does the CSRB have the right to conduct formal de novo

evidentiary hearings under its statutory provisions when the
hearing before Corrections was not subject to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) and was not part of the formal grievance
procedures as set forth by statute?
An agency's interpretation or construction of general law is
reviewed without deference to the agency but is viewed on a
correctness standard.
3.

See: Morton, Id.

Is it appropriate for the CSRB to retain jurisdiction

over matters once appealed to it where changed circumstances become
2

known during the appeal process but which are fully aired at the
evidentiary hearing?
An agency's interpretation or construction of general law is
reviewed without deference to the agency but is viewed on a
correctness standard.

See; Morton, Id.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The statutes and rules applicable to this matter are either
cited in the text of the brief or appear in the Addendums.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent, CSRB, acknowledged in its entry of appearance that
it would limit its discussion in this matter to the procedural and
jurisdictional issues it has been asked to address. Therefore it
will not set forth its own statement of the case. While the CSRB
does not agree fully witH either of the statements found in
Petitioner's and Respondent Hummel's briefs, it believes that
Respondent Hummel (Hummel) is more accurate in its statement of the
case and agrees that Petitioner's statement is more argumentative
than a statement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The CSRB has already set forth in its decision what it sees
are the relevant facts of this case.

It chooses not to address

further the facts of the actual hearing and refers the court to the
voluminous recitation of the facts in its Decision.

It does,

however, desire to set forth a few facts relevant to the issues of
jurisdiction which it feels are relevant to its argument.
3

A series of allegations (charges) were made against Hummel in
the form of an Administrative Complaint filed against him by the
Inspector General's Division of the Department of Corrections
(Addendum A in Corrections Reply Brief, R. 267-270). As part of the
complaint, Hummel was ordered to appear before Administrative Law
Judge Spencer Robinson for a hearing on the charges (R. 270). A
hearing on the charges was held on April 25, 1990 (R.271).
A Report and Recommendation was issued by the Administrative
Law Judge to management of Corrections regarding the charges on May
10, 1991 (Addendum B in Corrections Addenda volume to its brief,
Agency Exhibit 18, R.271-281).

The Report found certain of the

charges were true and recommended that the charges so found
justified disciplinary action.

The Administrative Law Judge did

not impose discipline or give Hummel notice of intent to discipline, but suggested a range of what he thought was appropriate
discipline if management chose to impose discipline.

The Report

and Recommendation was not a notice of disciplinary actions but
suggested that the range of discipline included suspension to
termination (R.281).
Upon receipt of the Report

and recommendation, O. Lane

McCotter, then Deputy Director of Corrections recommended to
executive director Gary W. Deland that Hummel be terminated.
Hummel was given notice of the recommended termination and the
reasons therefore by letter dated May 14, 1991. Hummel requested
an appellate hearing on the intent to terminate him from employment
(R.282).

An appellate hearing (4th Level hearing under the CSRB
4

statutes) was held with Deputy Director David Franchina on May 23,
1991 (R.282).

Mr. Franchina issued a Final Order, 89 GWD 39

sustaining

recommendation

the

of

termination

(Addendum

C in

Corrections Addenda volume to its brief, Agency Exhibit 19, R.28283) .

The Final Order recited the procedural history as to that

stated in this paragraph.
Mr. Franchina's Order dated May 28, 1991, following the
department level appeal hearing, was the decision of termination
from which Hummel appealed to the CSRB.
After Judge Richard Moffat of the Third Judicial District
Court granted Hummel's Writ of Habeas Corpus and set aside his
conviction

for child abuse, counsel

for Hummel made several

attempts to resolve the issue with Corrections to no avail.

On

virtually the eve of when the matter was set for hearing and after
six months of knowledge of the setting aside of the conviction,
Corrections attempted to have the matter remanded. The request was
denied and the matter was ordered to proceed to formal hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Historically

and pursuant

to statute, the CSRB and its

predecessors have conducted evidentiary hearings where the hearing
officer has been the fact finder for purposes of reviewing a department head's decision. These evidentiary hearings have been in
the form of de novo reviews wherein no deference was given to the
findings of departments.

Deference, however, was given to the

ultimate decision of discipline to determine whether the facts as
found by the hearing officer supported
5

the decision of the

department head or whether that decision was an abuse pf discretion.
The hearing held before Corrections' ALJ was based on a
complaint filed against the employee and was really part of the
investigative process.

Only after the ALJ determined that the

employee had violated policy and that those violations justified
discipline did he issue a Report and Recommendation suggesting that
discipline be imposed.

It was only then that the employee was

notified that disciplinary action was pending and he was given a
right to a hearing before the executive director's designee.

The

hearing before the ALJ was not subject to UAPA nor was it part of
the grievance process. As such# the only formal hearing under UAPA
was the evidentiary hearing before the CSRB's hearing officer.
Hearings of a de novo nature inherently are different than
previous hearings since new evidence can be introduced and since
the hearing officer is not bound by what took place at the former
hearing.

Changed circumstances, as long as they are aired in full

before the hearing officer are legitimate matters to be heard by
the CSRB and do not mandate that matters be remanded to the
department.

The CSRB has the authority to determine the facts as

found at the time of the hearing and determine whether the facts as
presented support the decision of the department head or whether
the discipline should be modified because to do otherwise would
constitute an abuse of discretion.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD AND ITS PREDECESSORS HAVE ALWAYS HELD DE NOVO EVIDENTIARY
HEARINGS PURSUANT TO STATUTORY AUTHORITY
GRANTED TO THEM WITH NO DEFERENCE TO AN AGENCY' S DECLARATION OF WHAT IT BELIEVES THE FACTS
TO BE.
Counsel for Corrections, at page 17 of Corrections' brief,
misstates not only the historical but the current statutory role of
the CSRB and its predecessors. Over the years, statutes and rules
have been implemented and carried out consistently with what has
taken place in this case. Corrections' argument that the CSRB has
exceeded its authority and "changed its rule" in the middle of the
Hummel matter to be something different than what the CSRB had done
previously is untrue and not supported by law or history.
The misstatement and misunderstanding becomes the basis upon
which Corrections claims that the CSRB has acted beyond the scope
of its authority.

Corrections states as follows:

The focus of the old rule was on the agency's
findings of fact; the CSRB hearing officer
simply reviewed those findings and their
evidentiary basis to determine if the findings
were supported by more than a trace of evidence that a reasonable person would find
credible.
The hearing officer was not a
factfinder but had the limited role of assuring that some credible evidence underlay the
agency's action.
Petitioners Brief, p. 17 (emphasis added).
Correction of this misstatement is necessary for the Court to
understand the role of the CSRB as well as the focus on the
appropriate rules. The CSRB hearing officer and the CSRB as a body
7

have never operated within its statutory scheme as .stated by
Corrections.

Hearing officers have always been fact finders and

have given deference to the ultimate decision of the department,
not the findings of a department.
Of the twenty some odd departments in Utah State government,
the overwhelming majority of them hold no formal hearings, prepare
no "findings of fact" and simply submit a letter to an employee
outlining what allegations they believe justify the discipline
imposed.

Corrections and a few other departments hold more

formalized review processes wherein a designee of the executive
director prepares findings of fact. These are the exceptions. To
state that hearing officers, by rule, focus on an agency's findings
of fact is unfounded.
Counsel for the Board has acted as

counsel for agencies in

approximately 50 evidentiary hearings before the CSRB and its
predecessors (Merit System Council and the Personnel Review Board)
since 1977. At no time has he ever known the Board or any of its
predecessors to unilaterally do as counsel for Corrections has
stated.
Counsel is aware of and has participated in parties stipulating that agency findings be adopted by hearing officers as true.
Normally this was done as parties argued issues of law rather than
issues of fact.

Also, he is aware that parties have stipulated

that hearing officers could consider evidence, decisions, transcripts, etc. that had been generated and introduced in department
level hearings.

Such evidence, however, was not introduced as
8

conclusive proof that the facts were true, but as added Evidence in
the "new hearing" to support a party's position that there was
either substantial evidence to support the allegations made by the
agency or from the employee's perspective, there was insufficient
evidence to meet the evidentiary burdens established by rule and
statute.
The earliest predecessor to the CSRB of which Counsel is aware
is the Merit System Council
council established

(Council) .

It was a five member

to hear, among other things, appeals of

terminations. The Council was established by the Utah Legislature
in 1965.

Its authority was found at Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-14

(1969) .

Addendum A to this brief contain the code sections

relative to this aspect of the Council's authority. At Subsection
(d) and (e) is found:
(d) An employee who is aggrieved by a decision of his department head may appeal the
decision to the merit system council which
shall set a time and date for hearing of the
appeal...
(e) Disciplinary actions shall be supported
by credible evidence, but the normal rules of
evidence in courts of law shall not apply in
hearings before the department or merit system
council.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-14(d) and (e) (1969, emphasis added).
Hearings before the Council included the introduction of
evidence to support the decision of the department head.

The

earliest published rules of the Council that counsel for the CSRB
was able to find were effective August 28, 1974 and pertinent
portions of those rules are included as Addendum B to this brief.
9

Those rules spell out in detail how hearings before the Council
would be handled

including the introduction of evidence and

examination of witnesses.

Under ARTICLE III - APPEALS, is found

the procedure for hearings. At Article III, Section 2, paragraph
2b.(2) is found, for example:
When the agency representative has finished
with his oral statements or has stated that he
has none to make, he may introduce witnesses
or material evidence in support of the agency's action. (Emphasis added).
Thereafter is contained a series of provisions which directly
provide for the presentation of evidence, witnesses, questions and
answers from interested parties in a cross examination format. The
rule at Article III, Section 2, paragraph 2c as it relates to the
employee's case contains the following language:
"Presentation of the appellant's case -- the
procedure here shall be exactly the same as
that for presentation of the case of the
agency except that the roles of the agency
representative and witnesses and those of the
appellant and his witnesses shall be reversed.
(Emphasis added).
According to Article III, Paragraph 3, the Council was then
required to make a written summary of the hearing and prepare its
decision.
While the Council was in existence since 1965, counsel for the
CSRB is unaware of any formal decisions rendered by the Council
prior to 1977.

This is not to say the Council did not hear and

decide cases, but over the years, as counsel has been involved with
personnel issues, he has attempted to locate every decision

10

rendered by the Council and has been unable to locate any decisions
prior to that date.
Counsel is not aware of Corrections being a party to any of
the hearings before the Council from 1977 until the Council's
repeal in 1979. However, its parent department, the Department of
Social Services, of which Corrections was a division at the time,
was the subject of nine of eighteen evidentiary hearings before the
five member Council for which formal decisions were issued. In all
such decisions, the Council issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and rendered a decision. One of those decisions, In the Matter
of the Appeal of Stanley J. Konkol, MSC 78-5 (1978) is attached as
Addendum C to this brief to show the nature of the process used.
The Utah Supreme Court in Department of Community and Economic
Development v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980)
recognized the Council's evidentiary de novo hearing process when
it stated:
Yet in this case, the State, in accordance
with the Merit Council procedural rules and
because of the nature of the case involved,
should also be allowed to have its representative in attendance at the Council hearing in
order to present, or assist in presenting, the
State's case in chief and rebuttal evidence,
and to conduct or assist in conducting crossexamination to assure an accurate and complete
disclosure of facts.
614 P.2d at 1262 (emphasis added).
The Personnel Review Board (PRB) was created by the 1979 Utah
Legislature.

The PRB's authority, as well as the statutory

authority

the Division

for

of

Personnel

Management

and

its

successors including the current Department of Human Resource
11

Management, was found in the Personnel Management Act,.. Utah Code
Ann.

§ 67-19-1 et. seq.

Also included was a very specific

statutory procedure for hearings before the hearing officers
appointed by the PRB.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-25(5) (1979 Supp.) states in part:
Informal rules of evidence and procedure are
applicable at such hearings. The aggrieved
employee and employer may, in addition to the
provisions of 67-19-22, be present at all
hearings, produce witnesses, examine and cross
examine witnesses. and examine documentary
evidence. A tape recording of the proceedings
shall be made and the transcript of the proceedings shall constitute the record of the
hearing.
The hearing officer shall render a written
decision supported by findings of fact and
conclusions of law within 15 working days
after the hearing. (Emphasis added).
While this language seems unmistakably clear, the PRB enacted
rules delineating the exact nature of the appeals hearing which was
an evidentiary de novo hearing conducted by the hearing officer.
In Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Sucher, 796 P.2d 721 (Utah App.
1990), this court specifically recognized the rules and provisions
by which the Board reviewed the record established by the hearing
officer. Therein this court acknowledged that the hearing officer
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law from which the PRB
reviewed the matter on appeal.

This court stated:

The PRB, in reviewing the hearing officer's
decision, found that the facts supported the
charge against Sucher.
The PRB decision
further stated that the hearing officer's
findings of fact and conclusions of law were
supported by the evidence...
796 P.2d at 723 (emphasis added).
12

The first formal rules of the PRB were published in 1981,
although the rules had been adopted earlier and hearings had been
conducted according to them since the inception of the PRB. Rule
20.0, SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A HEARING, delineates the very essence
of de novo hearings as well as the requirement under Rule 20.8 that
the hearing officer

"will make and enter a written decision and

order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law."

See

Addendum D of this brief.
The PRB rules were modified and refined over the years and the
rules cited by this court in Sucher were consistent with the
earlier rules.

In all instances, the hearings were evidentiary,

regardless of what took place at the department level.

Hearing

officers prepared their own findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and rendered decisions based on their findings of fact.
In 1989, the PRB was renamed the Career Service Review Board
with its statutory authority being removed from the Personnel
Management Act and a separate statute was enacted for the CSRB
alone. This change is found at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq.
(Supp. 1989).

There are several provisions of this act which

specifically authorize the Board to hold evidentiary de novo
hearings.
Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-202 (3) and 204(2) (a) (ii) , CSRB
board members and the administrator have the right to subpoena
witnesses, documents and other evidence for hearings over which it
has jurisdiction. The Administrator, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
67-19a-204(2)(b) selects a hearing officer to "adjudicate and
13

resolve personnel administration disputes". Under Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-19a-303, employees may call other employees as witnesses at
all hearings.

Further, under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-404(1), the

administrator,

upon

determining

jurisdictional

requirements

that

appoints

a

grievance

meets

the

a

hearing

officer

"to

adjudicate the complaint".
Utah Code Ann.

§ 67-19a-405 provides for a pre-hearing

conference at which time issues to be heard are set forth, facts
are stipulated to, if possible, lists "of witnesses, exhibits and
papers or other evidence that each party intends to offer as
evidence" are exchanged and established.
The official record of the proceedings is not the department
level hearing record but that established at the hearing officer
level. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406 (1) (b) clearly establishes that
the verbatim court reporter record and "all exhibits, briefs,
motions, and pleadings received by the hearing officer are the
official record of the proceedings" (emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(c) sets forth

the "burden of

proof" for the hearing. That burden is an evidentiary burden. The
party with the burden of proof must prove the case before the
hearing officer by "substantial evidence."

Pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 67-19a-408 any appeal to the CSRB will be made on the
official record of the hearing officer's hearing (transcript and
exhibits, briefs, etc.) as pointed out above. That official record
is not the record created at the department level except as

14

introduced and used as evidence in the evidentiary hearing before
the hearing officer.
The CSRB issued revised rules in December 1989 addressing the
newly enacted statutory scheme.

These rules are found under its

then assigned number, R140, there having been a renumbering of
rules from those cited in Sucher. Of particular note is Rule 1401-20.C. Utah Admin. Code 1990 (Addendum E ) .
Counsel for Corrections cites that rule from the 1992 Utah
Admin. Code as Rule R137-1-20.C (1992), there again being a rule
number change from 140 to 137. While the citation of the rule is
correct, she misstates the focus and historical import of the rule
as it relates to the hearings held by hearing officers.

Correc-

tions argues on pages 16-18 of its brief that the CSRB has changed
its rule to do away with deference to an agency's findings of fact.
The rule cited by Corrections as well as all prior rules and
statutes never gave deference to an agency's findings of fact. The
old rule, as Corrections refers to it, is consistent with the new
rule cited by it.

Both the "old" rule and the "new" rule give

deference to the "decision" of the department head.
decision?

What is that

It is the ultimate disciplinary action taken against an

employee based on the facts established at the CSRB hearing. Utah
Admin. Code R140-1-20C. (1990) , the same rule cited by Corrections,
states as follows:
An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new
hearing for the record, with both parties
being accorded full administrative due process. The hearing officer shall give latitude
and deference to an agency's prior decision
when the latter is supported by the findings
15
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I

of fact based on the evidence.
added).

(Emphasis

The "new rule," as alluded to by Corrections, was not a "new
rule" regarding deference, but a clarification of what had been the
rule and practice for years. Each version of the rule states that
there will be a "new hearing for the record." Utah Code Ann. § 6719a-406(1)(b) explicitly states that the "record" of the hearing
consists of the exhibits, transcript, evidence and testimony
presented at the step 5 hearing.

That is the "new hearing"

referred to in rule and supported in statute.
As pointed out, the CSRB statutes, as well as the statutes of
its predecessors, provided de novo evidentiary hearings for those
employees appealing matters to the CSRB. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a202(1) (a) sets forth the jurisdiction of the Board as that of "to
review appeals from career service employees and agencies of
decisions about...dismissals..." (emphasis added).

Thereafter is

found the process for evidentiary hearings to fulfill that mandate.
It is the "decision" of the department head which is accorded
deference. In order to determine if that "decision" is entitled to
deference, a hearing must be held to obtain facts and evidence
sufficient to support the imposition of the agency head's discretion in meting out discipline.
Utah Admin. Code R137-20.C.2. (1993) provides exactly that.
After the hearing officer determines through the evidentiary
hearing he conducts that the allegations against the employee are
supported by substantial evidence (credible, believable evidence),
then "the CSRB hearing officer shall give deference to the decision
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of the agency or the appointing authority" unless, as articulated
by this court in Utah Dep't of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439
(Utah App. 1991) , the imposition of the discipline was an abuse of
discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-203(4) specifically authorizes
the CSRB to make rules governing "the use, calling, attendance,
participation, and fees of witnesses in grievance proceedings;"
(emphasis added).

The above rule provides that after such an

evidentiary hearing where the hearing officer makes findings of
fact, deference will be given to the "decision" of the department
head

if

that

decision

is

supported

by

credible, believable

evidence.
Corrections is trying to confuse this court by dealing with
semantics as to what the evidentiary hearing is. The CSRB and its
predecessors have never given deference to the findings of fact of
an agency.

The hearings have always been a "new hearing."

A new

hearing is a new hearing - it is not the old hearing revisited.
The new hearing is for the purpose of insuring that merit principles are protected and that the employee was dealt with appropriately under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) which requires "cause"
before termination or other discipline can be taken against the
employee.

To infer that the old rule somehow gives deference to

the findings of fact is inaccurate and in error.

Both the "old

rule" and the "new rule" as referred to by Corrections give
deference to the same thing - the "decision" of the agency.
Contrary to Corrections' assertions, the rule change which it
so

strenuously

objects

to, did not
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institute

a

"bifurcated

approach."

It was this court in Sucher and Despain that, clarified

the process. As noted, this court overturned decisions of the CSRB
by directing that the decision of whether a department head acted
appropriately depends on two phases.

The first phase deals with

there being sufficient facts as determined by the substantial
evidence standard to support the decision.

Once the hearing

officer determines the facts to be supportive in that manner, the
hearing officer and hence the CSRB itself must sustain the decision
if the decision is not an abuse of discretion.

See;

In re:

Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986), which was argued by
Corrections in those cases and on which this court relied for
direction.
Corrections attempts to misconstrue the clear language of the
CSRB's statutory authority by asserting that its right to hold de
novo hearings and create a record independent from the agency to
insure that "cause" as is required by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1)
(1993) should be disregarded.

This is clearly

an attempt by

Corrections to have this court "judicially legislate" a change
which never has existed and is clearly not provided in the statute.
To do so would nullify the CSRB's statutory purpose and provide no
independent evidentiary review of actions taken against employees.
The CSRB points out that Corrections has been the subject of
numerous de novo evidentiary hearings before the PRB and the CSRB
hearing officers since 1979.

In fact, the first evidentiary

hearing before the newly appointed hearing officers under Utah Code
Ann. 67-19-25(5) was a Corrections hearing.
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It was entitled Jerry

Fisher v. Adult Probation and Parole. 1 PRB/H.O. 1 (1979).
Fisher was terminated for misconduct.

Mr.

The hearing officer upheld

the dismissal after conducting an evidentiary review and issuing
findings of fact.

A copy of that decision is attached to this

brief as Addendum F.
Since 1979, approximately 185 decisions have been issued by
hearing officers - all of which were based on evidentiary and de
novo hearings processes.

Hearing officers uniformly created a

separate record from the evidence presented at their hearings and
issued

independent

decisions.

findings of fact, conclusions of law and

Of the approximate 185 hearing officer decisions,

Corrections has been a party to and involved in approximately 34 of
the evidentiary hearings.
The CSRB recognizes that the failure of a party to object to
procedures used in previous hearings does not waive the right of
the party to raise the issue in subsequent hearings. As such, the
fact that Corrections has been involved with this process for so
long does not preclude the issue being raised here. However, it is
unfair and improper to assert that hearing officers have given
deference to the findings of fact of the agencies and that holding
the hearings as described above is beyond the authority of the
CSRB.

The CSRB urges this court to reject the argument as being

without merit.
POINT II
THE HEARING HELD BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS NOT SUBJECT TO UAPA, IS NOT PART OF
THE GRIEVANCE PROCESS, AND IS SIMPLY A CONTIN19

UATION OF THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS FROM WHICH
A RECOMMENDATION IS MADE TO THE EXECUTIVE*
DIRECTOR AS TO WHETHER THE EMPLOYEE ENGAGED IN
CONDUCT THAT WOULD JUSTIFY ACTION.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) sets forth the procedures which
must be followed in order to dismiss a career service employee.
Corrections asserts that because it holds an evidentiary hearing,
the CSRB must give deference to its findings.

Yet, the hearing

held is based on allegations of wrongdoing, is not part of the
grievance process, and

is in essence

a continuation of the

investigative or fact finding process. None of the provisions of
section 18(5) are implemented until well after this "hearing" is
concluded.

The hearing becomes a partner with the complaint in

that it gives an opportunity to the employee to officially respond
to the charges before the charges are forwarded to the executive
director.
As stated in Point I, above, there are twenty some departments
in state government.

Out of all the departments, Corrections is

the only department which conducts its procedures in the manner
presented to this court.

The CSRB is aware of only two other

departments that regularly hold evidentiary hearings.
The Department of Human Services (DHS) holds a hearing after
a notice of intent to discipline is given the employee.

DHS's

hearing constitutes the hearing before the department head on
appeal of the proposed action.

That is the hearing opportunity

provided an employee under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) (d) . A tape
recording is made which constitutes the record of that hearing.
Yet, the holding of such evidentiary hearings is discretionary with
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the department head and there have been numerous occasions when
informal meetings with the department head have sufficed.
The Department of Public Safety, on the other hand, conducts
an evidentiary hearing but does not record the proceedings and
hence does not retain any record of the testimony given.

On

occasion, such hearings are part of the process to determine
whether the department head should give notice of discipline and on
other occasions they constitute the department level hearing in the
grievance process.

From time to time, other departments hold

informal evidentiary hearings, but not on a regular basis.
According to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-30(2), grievances of
dismissals are subject to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA) and are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq.

In

essence, when the dismissal takes place, it becomes part of the
formal procedures and protections of UAPA and the right to formal
evidentiary hearings is provided.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 sets

forth the procedures of formal evidentiary hearings which allows
for de novo hearings.
As permitted by statute, the CSRB, as an administrative
agency, has modified the procedures to meet the special needs in
its hearings. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-30(5) makes the grievance a
request for agency action from which appeal is taken. Pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq. hearings process goes through
the CSRB which then renders a decision based on the protections of
UAPA.
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There are no formal adjudications under UAPA of charges
brought against employees at the department level.

The CSRB,

however, pursuant to UAPA has declared that "For purposes of
Section

63-46b-4

of

the

Administrative

Procedures

Act, all

Adjudicative proceedings of the Career Service Review Board are to
be construed as formal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Admin. Code
R137-1-17.B. (1992).

As such, employees have no formal adjudica-

tions until they appeal to the CSRB under Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-1930(2) and 67-19a-406.
The hearings and proceedings at the department level under
Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18(5) are before the dismissal or disciplinary action takes place.
subject to UAPA.

These are internal in nature and not

Until the discipline is imposed, there is no

grievable event from which an appeal can be taken

(See: Tavlor v.

Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432 (Utah App. 1989).
UAPA specifically excludes internal matters from the protections and provisions of that law at Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(2) (e)
wherein "internal personnel actions within an agency concerning its
own employees, or judicial review of those actions" are listed.
The CSRB statute at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(1)(a) lists those
matters which may then become subject to UAPA through appeal to the
Board.

Dismissal is listed as one of those actions.

Hence, once

dismissal is imposed, then and only then is the action subject to
UAPA i£ the employee appeals to the CSRB.

If an employee chooses

not to appeal, the decision of termination remains an internal
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personnel action and is not subject to the heightened scrutiny of
the formal processes under UAPA.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) lists the procedures necessary to
terminate an employee.

Therein is listed:

(b) The department head or designated
representative notifies the employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion.
(c) The employee has no less than five
working days to reply and have the reply
considered by the department head.
(d) The employee has an opportunity to
be heard by the department head or designated
representative.
(e) Following the hearing, the employee
may be dismissed or demoted if the department
head finds adequate cause or reason (emphasis
added).
Emphasized

above

is the

fact

that

the grievance

process

doesn't begin until the employee has been "notified" in writing as
to the reasons for the dismissal.

Then, after that notice is

given, he has an opportunity to have a hearing before the executive
director or his designee.

Only after that appeal hearing can the

executive director dismiss the employee if he finds adequate cause.
As will be shown, the procedure used in Corrections takes place
before notice is ever given to the employee and is therefore not a
part of the appeal hearing to the executive director.
Each department handles disciplinary matters differently. The
United States Supreme Court in Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill.
470

U.S.

532

(1985),

held

that

pre-termination

hearings

are

required as part of a government career service system to comply
with the constitutional provision that property interests cannot be
taken without "due process" of law.
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The Court held, however, that

formality is not necessary.

All that is required is that the

employee be given notice of the charges against him and be given an
opportunity to respond.

In essence, as long as an employee is

notified as to the reasons and is given an opportunity to meet with
the employer before termination is imposed, pre-termination due
process is met. That is consistent with the provisions of Utah law
cited above.
Granted, Corrections has chosen to be more formal in the prenotification stages in hopes of clearly identifying to the employee
what the allegations are for which he is charged.

The CSRB takes

no position as to how a department develops its case or determines
whether to give notice of pending discipline. A department should
not, however, have the authority to nullify the CSRB's statutory
responsibility and authority to conduct independent reviews of what
agencies do simply because an agency wants to be more formal in its
"informal"

stage.

This would require legislative

changing the statute.

action in

This appeal is not the proper place to

address that issue.
Simply because a department chooses to do more than is
required by statute or court decision should not nullify the
statutorily established procedures and obligations of the CSRB.
Over the years, Counsel for the CSRB has represented Corrections in
various matters in the personnel area.
formalized fact finding hearings.

It didn't always hold

On many occasions, a simple

meeting was held with the executive director.

Nothing in Correc-

tions' statutes or the CSRB statutes require that Corrections do
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what it does.

Tomorrow, Corrections could revert to simple

meetings with the executive director as its department level
hearing without any formalized hearings as precursors.

The

documents included in this case by Corrections show that the
department level hearing is in deed an informal discussion.
The hearings currently held at Corrections - this case in
particular - are not even a part of the grievance process as is
provided for in Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-18 or 67-19a-l et. seq.
This entire matter began with the Inspector General's Office of the
Department

issuing

what

has

been

termed

an

"Administrative

Complaint" (Addendum A to Corrections Reply Brief, R.267-270) . The
document simply notifies Hummel that he has been charged with
violating policies.

There is no indication that any action is

being taken against him.

In fact, at this point, no action is

contemplated or taken and he is not notified that adverse action
will be taken against him.
Hummel is not given an opportunity to appeal to the executive
director in this complaint because there is nothing to appeal - it
is simply allegations against him.

Instead, Hummel is ordered to

appear before the Administrative Law Judge. His failure to appear
for this hearing would be considered "in subordination" [sic]. In
essence, his appearance is a forced appearance to answer to charges
against him.

It is in essence a "fact finding" procedure to

determine what the department believes the facts are and how Hummel
responds to them. All of this is done before any personnel action
is taken.
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At this point, the Administrative Law Judge is not governed by
UAPA.

As such, the protections of UAPA do not apply.

The ALJ is

also not the designee of the Department head pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 67-19-18(5) since there has been no notification in writing
as to any disciplinary action contemplated against him.
Through this "fact finding hearing," the ALJ would be in a
better position to "counsel" the executive director as to whether
he believes an employee has violated any policies and if so,
whether he believes disciplinary action should be contemplated. If
the charges were determined to be unfounded, it can only be assumed
that the matter would end and no letter of disciplinary action
would be sent to the employee.
Agency Exhibit 18 (Addendum B, Corrections Addendums, R.271281) makes it clear that this hearing was simply a fact finding
hearing as the CSRB alleges. Granted, the ALJ determined that from
what came before him the matter justified disciplinary action. He
suggested at R.281 that the sanction could be between 30 days off
without pay up to termination.

Still, at the time of this Report

and Recommendation, Hummel had never been notified that any action
would be taken against him.
Agency Exhibit 19 (Corrections Addendum C, R.282-83) clearly
sets forth what happened after the ALJ issued his Report and
Recommendation on May 10, 1991.

It was not until May 14, 1991,

that Hummel was given a written notice of the recommended termination.

Thereafter, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18 (5) (d) ,

Hummel was given an opportunity to meet with the executive
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director's designee in a pre-termination hearing on May 23, 1991.
This was an informal meeting without evidence being taken or
testimony given. It was a meeting between Mr. David Franchina and
Mr. Hummel.
The CSRB concedes that the Mr. Franchina relied on the Report
and Recommendation of the ALJ in his discussion with Hummel, but
regardless of how formal the fact finding hearing was, it was not
handled as part of the appeals process but was simply a part of the
investigative process, though more formal it was.
This investigative process utilized by Corrections is based
upon a statutory delegation of authority at Utah Code Ann. § 64-1328(1). Therein, Corrections' "administrative hearings office" may
consider

or

review

"issues

involving

staff"

and

"any other

administrative matters as assigned by the executive director." In
conducting such departmental hearings on "issues involving staff,"
Corrections' "hearing officer" is to maintain only a "summary
record of all hearings - but not an "official record of the
proceeding" as is required by the CSRB's hearing officer (Utah Code
Ann. § 67-19a-406(1)(b)). In sum, these departmental investigative
hearings are not formal adjudications of complaints under UAPA.
Hummel, pursuant to Loudermill, was given an opportunity to
informally meet with the designee of the executive director.

It

was the Final Order "89 GWD 39" (R.282-3) which was the notification under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) (e) that the termination was
upheld. Thereafter a grievable event took place where the employee
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could appeal that decision to the CSRB and be subject to the
protections of UAPA and the grievance statute and rules.
Under UAPA, everything at the department level regarding
personnel

issues is exempt

from UAPA and is thus informal.

Evidence and possibly the transcript of the department level
hearing can be introduced into evidence, but until a situation
makes it to the CSRB processes, a reviewing agency would not have
the obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Corrections is attempting to have this court judicially
legislate

that

its

internal

investigative

and

fact

finding

procedures are part of the state employment grievance process.
That is simply not true.
declaring.

There is no justification for so

Until the ALJ determines what he will believe as fact

in making a recommendation to the executive director and further,
until action is taken based on that recommendation, there is no
formalized notice to the employee regarding what sanction he is
defending himself against.
Even with the facts the way they are, an employee still has an
opportunity to attack the entire process including the imposition
of discipline.

There was never a formalized hearing process to

discuss the ultimate sanction.

Mr. Franchina's Final Order makes

clear that it was an informal discussion.
Any career employee, under the provisions of the Grievance and
Appeal Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq. has the
right to have a formal hearing before the CSRB and require his or
her department to establish both sufficient credible facts to
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justify the allegations as well as the ultimate decision. Then, as
pointed out in the prior argument, if the agency can establish that
substantial evidence exists to support the allegations, the hearing
officer and the CSRB will give deference to the agency's decision
unless the decision was an abuse of discretion.
POINT III
THE DE NOVO EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS PROVIDE THAT
A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT DECISION WILL BE
MADE ON THE EVIDENCE THAT IS ADMITTED IN THE
HEARING AND CHANGES IN EVIDENCE DO NOT MANDATE
THAT THE MATTER BE SENT BACK TO THE DEPARTMENT.
As has been shown in the above points, the statutory authority
to hold evidentiary hearings is clear and unambiguous.

The

decisions from these "new hearings" are based on the evidence that
is presented
hearings.

at the hearings themselves and not

from other

If a party believes something that was introduced or

said at a prior hearing was important to the new hearing, then that
party can present it in the new hearing or present testimony of
what had happened.
Counsel for the Board has personally been a part of hearings
where tapes of prior department level hearings were introduced into
evidence and the hearing officers have relied on what was said in
those hearings as it was a part of the new hearing.

The parties

have the right and authority to make their cases within reason and
within broad standards of relevance and credibility.
Now, Corrections has argued that a "change of circumstances"
necessitates the remand of the matter to the Department. Once the
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matter is properly before the CSRB, the parties arfe free to
introduce

new

evidence,

ask

different

questions,

do

formal

discovery, and in essence present a new case with even new twists
and emphasis than was done before.
Because the hearings before the CSRB are formal under UAPA,
there is a heightened independence and formality in the review
process separate and apart from what an agency allows or does
internally.

The CSRB asserts that it is an inherent "given" that

de novo hearings always have the potential for "changed" testimony,
changed evidence - in essence, changed circumstances.
The Board finds Correction's argument regarding remand based
on changed circumstances and certain language in the interim
decision of this court wherein the CSRB was ordered to appear
troubling at best and disturbing at most.
conducts

independent

evidentiary

It is the CSRB that

hearings

existent at the time of the hearing.

based

on

evidence

All changed circumstances

which the parties desire to present to the hearing officer are
presented

and

taken into consideration

as part

of the

"new

hearing."
Through its argument (which piggy backs on the proposition
that the CSRB has no authority to find facts) , Corrections is
advocating that the CSRB ignore its directive to hold de novo
evidentiary hearings and any time a change of circumstances from
that which was presented at the department level is detected, a
remand is required.

That is not the statutory process.

Once the

decision is made by the executive director, the employee has the
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right to appeal to the CSRB which then takes jurisdiction of the
appeal and renders a decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l
et. seq.
Without belaboring the point, it is quite clear that when de
novo hearings are held, new evidence can be introduced, different
questions asked, cross examination conducted which was not done
before, new rebuttal evidence submitted, etc.

Indeed, Utah Code

Ann. § 67-19-18(5} only requires that an employee be given an
opportunity to have a hearing with the department head.

It does

not compel attendance.
Hence, if a notice of intent to discipline is given to an
employee and the employee waives his right to meet with the
department head or his designee, that permits the department head
to make a decision as to discipline without input from the
employee.

After the letter of termination is given and the

termination becomes effective, for example, the employee has 20
working days within which to appeal to the CSRB for a "new
hearing."

See: Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5).

As a result, the employee would not be prohibited from
presenting evidence or defenses at the CSRB hearing which was not
known by the department head or "changes the circumstances."

The

CSRB maintains that it is not obligated to send a matter back,
either sua sponte or at a party's request just because a party
believes that a new "twist" or new information has been uncovered
in the hearing officer's hearing.
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That happens all of the time.

In Mr. Hummel's case, the CSRB acted well within its discretion
when it did not grant the department's request for a remand.
After a department head makes his decision, the CSRB reviews
the ultimate decision and determines based on the facts presented
at the evidentiary hearing

(whether they remain the same are

different, or are modified through the hearing process) whether
that ultimate decision is within the discretion of the director or
is an abuse of that discretion.

Even if the testimony or facts

change significantly, the responsibility is still with the CSRB to
make that determination.
As noted earlier, there is no formal hearing process under the
protections of UAPA at Corrections' level as part of the employee
grievance process. As such, there is no record to be reviewed per
se because UAPA considers such matters

"informal."

Informal

matters have the right to formal adjudications as de novo hearings.
While Corrections maintains that its record is sufficient, as a
matter of law, it is not.
Those parts of the department level fact finding hearing which
Corrections believed were relevant could have been introduced into
evidence at the CSRB hearing.

Had Corrections attempted to

introduce relevant parts of its hearing or "record" and had the
hearing officer refused to allow them in, then the proper argument
would have been to raise the issue before the CSRB at the appellate
level to determine if the hearing officer had committed error.
That is what happens when this court reviews the evidentiary
decisions of district courts. This court is well aware of numerous
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instances where decisions of trial courts have been reversed
because of errors in evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the recent case of Archer v. Board
of State Lands and Forestry, Case No. 940214, Slip Opinion, October
11, 1995, addresses de novo review of informal proceedings.

The

Court states at page 3 of the Slip Opinion:
This section [§ 63-46b-15(l) (a)] requires that
the district court's review of informal adjudicative proceedings be performed by holding a
new trial rather than by reviewing the informal record. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d
449, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The State
argues that where the governing statute grants
discretion to an administrative agency, the
standard of review in a trial de novo of an
informal administrative proceeding should be
limited to determining whether the agency's
decision was reasonable in view of the facts
presented at the district court.
In other
words, the State argues that the district
court's de novo review of an informal proceeding should defer to the reasonable exercise of
statutorily delegated discretion to the Division. We disagree.
Instead, we note with approval and adopt the
rule previously used in two decisions from the
Utah Court of Appeals establishing the right
to a new trial without deference to the determinations of an informal administrative proceeding. ..review bv trial de novo means a new
trial with no deference to the administrative
proceedings below.
Case No. 940214, Slip Opinion, October 11, 1995, p. 3 (emphasis
added).
Under UAPA, that which Corrections did is informal at best and
therefore subject to a review by trial de novo at the CSRB level.
The CSRB obviously recognizes differences between Archer and its
statutory provisions and further understands the previous cases
this Court has rendered in appeals from the CSRB.
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Yet, the

principle appears to be correct that a review by the CSRB in
creating its own record is de novo and therefore the review of the
agency decision will be made based on what is introduced at that
hearing.
In the Matter of Noren. 621 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1980), a pre-UAPA
case, the Utah Supreme Court was faced with determining what effect
the expungement of a criminal record had on an agency's decision
when the expungement took place between the issuance of the agency
decision and before the matter was heard in district court.

The

court rejected the argument that the agency decision be sustained
simply based on what was before the agency.

In essence, new

evidence can be introduced in a de novo trial and if the new
evidence points to a new conclusion, then the new conclusion should
be implemented.

As stated by the court:

Appellant also argues that the District
Court, in reviewing an administrative decision, may consider only whether appellant
acted within his statutory powers or abused
his discretion, and evidence which was not
available to him cannot be considered.
He
contends the facts and the law must be applied
as thev existed at the inception of the lawsuit, which was in this case, he asserts, the
original application for license.
621 P.2d at 1248 (emphasis added).

Thereafter the court rejected

this argument indicating that the appeal was really an original
action and therefore the court

could make the determination

existing as of the date of the initiation of the action in district
court and not as the agency had them.
The CSRB understands that the appeal before it is not an
"original action" as indicated in Noren. However, as in Noren the
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court viewed the beginning of the action when the matter was filed
in district court.

In this case, the appeal to the CSRB is the

beginning of the UAPA hearing process under the Grievance and
Appeals Act,

Since the CSRB has the right by statute to hold an

evidentiary hearing in order to determine facts, the determination
is made as to what the facts are at the time the matter was heard.
A change of circumstances, such as happened in Noren, did not
dictate a remand to the department. The CSRB has the authority to
view the department head's decision in light of the evidence
presented.
Whether the CSRB correctly dealt with that evidence and the
expungement - as it relates to the ultimate decision of the CSRB will not be argued by the Board.

Corrections and Hummel have

argued those subtleties and the CSRB will not spend its time
justifying its decision in that regard.

That is now properly

before this Court to decide whether the CSRB ruled appropriately.
Nonetheless, all evidence regarding the expungement was before the
hearing officer and the hearing proceeded based on the evidence
presented at the hearing officer hearing.

The evidence presented

by Corrections was not based on the "conviction" because at the
time of the hearing there was no conviction.
The CSRB, whose statutory authority it is to review the
agency's action, can determine if the circumstances are so changed
as to justify a change in discipline because it would constitute an
abuse of discretion.

Indeed, Corrections has argued in Point II-E

that the hearing officer and the CSRB misapplied the evidence that
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was presented in reaching their conclusion. That is an issue this
Court must reach since the CSRB has already spoken. That, however,
is an issue of law and does not demand that a remand be ordered in
this case.

If the CSRB was in error, the Court can correct that

error. If the CSRB was correct, then the decision should be upheld
because the change in circumstances justified a revision of the
department's disciplinary penalty.
In another

"pre-UAPA"

case, the

Supreme

Court

held

in

University of Utah v. Industrial Commission, 736 P.2d 630 (Utah
1983) that:
Thus, we viewed the district court as an
independent fact finder and not as an intermediate appellate court.
Similarly, in Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Confer. 61A P. 2d (Utah
1983), we once again noted that the district
court's role was one of fact finder and that
it could affirm the findings of the Industrial
Commission or make its own findings. We noted
that the "entire case file before the commission" be filed with the district court permits
the court to conduct its trial de novo by
utilizing the record before the Commission.
However, we observed that this "would not
prevent the district court from adding to that
record if it elected to do so."
... The legislature clearly intended that the
court be the fact finder on review. Thus, the
findings of the Commission are superseded by
the findings of the district court, and no
particular deference need be given to the
former.
736 P.2d at 633 (emphasis added).
While the Board recognizes that this case is not directly
applicable, it believes the principle enunciated in the decision is
proper and on point. The Board hearing officer is indeed a reviewing officer to determine what facts are supported by credible
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evidence at the time of the hearing and whether those facts support
the decision made.
While Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) establishes that it is the
department head that determines whether there is cause to terminate
an employee, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq. also establishes
that it is the CSRB that holds the evidentiary hearing to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision and
whether the decision is an abuse of discretion.
The CSRB finds it difficult to understand why there is now a
contesting of the Board's jurisdiction when Hummel appealed pursuant to statute and statute confers jurisdiction on the CSRB.
Every de novo evidentiary hearing is

"different" from prior

hearings.
To follow Corrections' argument to its natural conclusion,
would require the CSRB hearing officer to immediately remand any
matter to the department head if he determined the facts were
different at his hearing than those relied on by the department
head. If the department head is in error as to what the facts are,
then it is the CSRB that determines the validity of the facts,
whether they are credible and how that affects the decision.
Otherwise, this, flies counter to the very statutes establishing
the CSRB.
The Board and it's hearing officers are not only statutorily
empowered to make the determinations, but they should not be
belittled in their ability to act reasonably. Corrections makes it
appear that such cannot possibly be the case, but refuses to
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acknowledge that the Board and its hearing officers have ruled
favorably in Corrections behalf on numerous occasions.
This appellate process is a safeguard for career employees to
insure that departments follow appropriate procedure and discipline
employees only for cause.
from making mistakes.

No judge, jury or board is insulated

The legal reporters are replete with

thousands of cases where such entities made mistakes or applied the
law improperly.
If the CSRB or other agencies act contrary to law or apply it
improperly, then it is the court's role to correct those errors.
Remanding cases back to the agency when the CSRB has statutory
authority to hear de novo hearings is not one of those errors that
needs to be corrected because it is not error.

As to the CSRB's

application of the law to this case, that is a different issue. It
is error for this court, however, to create restrictions and add
procedural requirements which are not provided in statute.
ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLICATION OF OPINION
Oral argument is not requested because argument has already
been conducted in this matter.

The Court desired the CSRB to

address issues of jurisdiction and procedure which it has done and
unless the court desires oral response to concerns it has, the CSRB
does not request oral argument.

The CSRB does, however, believe

that regardless of how the court rules on the merits of the appeal
of Corrections, the issues raised and addressed by all parties,
particularly regarding the CSRB's jurisdiction and procedure are
significant and should be addressed formally in published form.
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CONCLUSION
The CSRB reiterates that it provides an unbiased fully
independent and "unattached" review process.

Employees may be

dismissed for "just cause". The CSRB's role is to insure that the
facts upon which discipline is based is valid and credible and that
the discipline is within discretion and not an abuse. To this end,
the Legislature has established the CSRB to be this independent
agency. To hold that the CSRB may not engage in the actions it has
taken and to agree with Correction's position is to judicially gut
the strength and authority of the CSRB and place undue burdens on
this

independent

review.

Such

a position

is unreasonable,

unworkable, contrary to existing statute and improper.
The de novo nature of fact gathering naturally includes the
adding of information in the new hearing which might not have been
available or might have changed the circumstances on which the
department head acted.
department.

This does not necessitate a remand to the

The CSRB is established to review such matters.

It

places an unworkable burden on the CSRB and its hearing officers to
determine what is a "substantial," "significant" or "material"
change which would necessitate a remand to the department head.
Corrections' argument should be rejected and the CSRB allowed to
deal with changes as they come forth in hearings.
DATED this <3$

day of October, 1995.

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for the CSRB
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-14 (1969)

MERIT SYSTEMS

•67-13-2

range for the payment of such compensation and expenses. Nothing
contained in this section shall be construed to relieve the state or the political subdivision thereof in which such property or any part thereof is
situated from its duty to furnish for such property or part thereof such
normal police protection as it ordinarily and customarily provides for
other property situated therein.
History: L. 1941 (2nd 8. S.), ck 55, § 10;
C. 1943, 82B-0-19.

to this end the provisions of this aet are
declared to be severable/'

Separability Clause.
Section 11 of Laws 1941 (2nd 8. 8.), ch.
35 (Code 1943, 82B-0-20) provided: "If
any provision of this aet or the application thereof to any person or circumstances
is held invalid, such invalidity shall not
affect other provisions or applications of
the act which can be given effect without
the invalid provision or application, and

Repealing Clause.
Section 12 of Laws 1941 (2nd S. 8.),
ch. 35 (Code 1943, 82B-0-21) provided that
all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with
the provisions of this act and not expressly repealed herein are repealed,
Collateral References,
StatesC=>57.
61 CJ.8. States § 49.

CHAPTER 13
MERIT SYSTEMS
Section 67-13-1.
67-13-2.
67-13-3.
67-13-4.
67-13-5.
67-13-6.
67-13-7.
67-13-8.
67-13-9.
67-13-10.
67-13-11.
67-13-12.
67-13-13.
67-13-14.
67-13-15.

Eepealed.
Establishment of state system—Purpose of act—Principles recognized.
Governor's authority and responsibility—Appointment and duties of
state director of personnel—Merit system director—Appointment,
organization and duties of merit system council.
Bules and regulations for personnel administration—Promulgation
of—Term of present program.
Division of responsibilities between personnel office and line agencies.
Positions exempt from merit provisions—Schedules of civil service—Allocation of positions—Bequests to change schedule assignment—"Merit system" and "classified civil service" denned.
Personnel with service prior to effective date—Provisions for retention in state service.
Employee accepting appointment to exempt position after effective
date—Beappointment register.
Payrolls examined by director—Certification of employees by director for hiring, change in pay or status and for pay.
Use of buildings of state, municipalities and political subdivisions
by state personnel office—State unitB to appropriate funds.
Appointments from registers—Examinations—Certification of applicants—Probationary period required—Tenure.
Classification of positions—Appeals—Pay plan.
Political activities of employees—Provisions of rules limiting activities^—Hatch Act not affected.
Dismissals—Appeals—Be duct ions in work force.
Separability provisions—Conformity of rules and regulations with
federal provisions.

67-13-1. Eepealed.
Repeal
Section 67-13-1 (L. 1959, ch. 74, § 1),
relating to merit systems in the fish and

game department and recreation eommis***, was repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 131,
117*

67-13-2. Establishment of state system—Purpose of act—Principles
recognized.—(a) The general purpose of this act is to establish for the
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67-13-14

67-13-13. Political activities of employees—Provisions of rules limiting activities—Hatch Act not affected.—Except as otherwise provided by
law or by rules and regulations promulgated- hereunder for federally
aided programs, the following provisions shall apply with regard to political activity of employees for all grades and positions in the merit system:
(a) The state director of personnel shall promulgate rules, subject to
the approval of the governor, to provide for limitations upon the political
activities of state officers or employees covered by the merit system. These
rules shall be drafted and interpreted to protect the officer or employee
from political exploitation or abuse and to allow individual state officers
and employees the broadest amount of personal political participation consistent with loyal service to their superiors in state government.
The rules shall incorporate, among others, the following provisions:
(1) No officer or employee covered by the merit system while in a pay
status shall be a state or federal officer in any political party organization,
or in any state-wide political campaign. Such officer or employee may be an
officer or a delegate in a political party organization at a county or inferior level or a delegate at a state or national level.
(2) No officer or employee covered by the merit system shall be a
candidate for any political office, provided that upon proper application,
an officer or employee may be granted leave of absence, without loss of
existing seniority or tenure to participate in a political campaign, either
as an officer or as a candidate; however, time spent during such political
leave shall not be counted for seniority purposes as being in service.
(3) No officer or employee covered by the merit system may engage
in any political activity during the hours of employment, nor shall any
person solicit political contributions from employees of the executive
branch during hours of employment or through state facilities or in any
manner impose assessments on state employees for political purposes; but
nothing in this section shall preclude voluntary contributions by a state
employee to the party of his choice.
(4) Partisan political activity shall not be a basis for employment,
promotion, demotion or dismissal, except that the state director of personnel shall promulgate rules subject to the approval of the governor providing for the discipline or punishment of a state officer or employee who
violates any provision of this section.
(b) Nothing contained herein shall be construed to permit partisan
political activity of any state employee who is prevented or restricted from
engaging in such political activity by the provisions of the federal Hatch

Act.
History: L. 1965, CIL 131, § 12.

Compiler's Notes.
The Hatch Aet, referred to in tubsec
(b), is compiled at 7 UJ3.C. {§ S61a-361i.

67-13-14. Dismissals—Appeals—Reductions in work force.—-(a) Dismissals from positions under the merit system shall only be to advance the
good of the public service, where funds have expired or work no longer
exists, or for such causes as inefficiency, insubordination, disloyalty to the
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.
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67-13-14

STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

There shall be no dismissal for reasons of race, national origin, religion or
political affiliation from the merit system.
(b) In any appeal from a charge of inefficiency, where the charge is
supported by credible evidence, there shall be a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the administrative officer, with the burden of proof resting upon
the employee bringing the appeal.
(c) Except in aggravated cases of misconduct, no person shall be
demoted or dismissed from a tenured position without the following procedures :
(1) Notification in writing by the department head of the reasons for
discharge.
(2) The employee shall have an opportunity to reply and have his
reply considered by his department head.
(3) An opportunity to be heard by his department head or designated
representatives.
(4) Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the department head finds adequate cause or reason.
(5) If the department head finds that retention of any employee would
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public interest, such employee may be summarily suspended pending administrative hearings and merit system council review.
(d) An employee who is aggrieved by a decision of his department
head may appeal the decision to the merit system council which shall set
a time and date for hearing of the appeal, and the employee shall have
a right to appear in person or by counsel. The decision of the merit system
council shall be final and there shall be no access to the courts.
(e) Disciplinary actions shall be supported by credible evidence, but
the normal rules of evidence in courts of law shall not apply in hearings
before the department head or merit system council.
(f) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of
workload, or lack of work shall be governed by retention rosters to be
established by the state director of personnel. Under such circumstances:
(1) The department head shall designate the category of work to be
eliminated, subject to review by the state director of personnel.
(2) Temporary and probationary workers shall be separated before
any tenured employee.
(3) Retention points for each tenured employee shall be computed,
allowing fifty per cent weight for his proficiency and fifty per cent weight
for his seniority in state government, including any military service fulfilled subsequent to original state appointment. Tenured employees shall
be separated in the order of their retention points, the employee with the
lowest points to be discharged first.
(4) Tenured employees who are separated in reductions in force shall
be placed on the reappointment register (provided for in section 67-138(a)(2)) and shall be reappointed without examination to any vacancies
for which they are qualified which occur within one year of the date of their
separation.
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History: L. 1965, ch. 131, § 13.

67-13-15

Collateral Eeferenccs.
Pre-employment conduct as ground for
discharge of civil service employee having
permanent status, 4 A. L. E. 3d 468.

67-13-15. Separability provisions—Conformity of rules and regulations with federal provisions.—(a) If any provision of this law or of any
regulation or order thereunder or the application of such provision to any
person or circumstance shall be held invalid, the remainder of this law and
the application of such provision of this law or of such regulation or order to persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid
shall still be regarded as having the force and effect of law.
(b) If any part of this act is found to be in conflict with federal
requirements which are a condition precedent to the allocation of federal
funds to the state, the conflicting part of this act is hereby declared to be
inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with respect to the
agencies directly affected, and such findings shall not affect the operation
of the remainder of this act in its application to the agencies concerned.
(c) Notwithstanding any provisions in this law to the contrary, no
regulation shall be adopted which would deprive the state of Utah or any
of its departments or institutions of federal grants or other forms of
financial assistance, and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall include standards, provisions, terms and conditions for personnel
engaged in the administration of federally aided programs, which shall, in
all respects, comply with the necessary requirements for a qualified merit
system under the standards applicable to personnel engaged in the administration of federally aided programs, including but not limited to the
following federal laws:
Social Security Act, Titles I (old-age assistance and medical assistance
for the aged), HI (unemployment compensation), IV (aid and services
to needy families with children), V (maternal and child welfare), X (aid to
the blind), XIV (aid to the permanently and totally disabled), and XVI
(aid to the aged, blind, or disabled, or for such aid and medical assistance
to the aged); the Public Health Service Act, including the Hospital Survey and Construction Act; the Wagner-Peyser Act, as amended; the Federal Civil Defense Act, as amended; the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964; and the Federal Interstate Highway Act.
History: I* 1965, CIL 131, § 14.
, _, ^
Compiler's Notes.
The Social Security Act, Title I, referred to in this section, is compiled at
42 UJ3.C. §§ 301 et seq; Title HI, at 42
U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq; Title IV, at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601 et seq; Title V, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701
et seq; Title X, at 42 TLS.C. §§ 1201 et
seq; Title XIV, at 42 UJ3.C. §§ 1351 et
seq; Title XVI, at 42 TJJ3.C. §§ 1381 et seq;
The Public Health Sendee Act is compiled at 42 UJS.C. §§ 201 et seq.
The Hospital Survey and Construction
Act is compiled at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291m.

The Wagner-Peyser Act, aa amended, 1B
compiled at 29 UJ3.C. §§ 49-49k and 89
TJJ3.C. §838.
The Federal Civil Defense Act is compiled at 50 Appx. §§2251 et seq.
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964
is compiled at 42 UJ3.C. §§ 2701 et seq.
The Federal Interstate Highway Act
is compiled at 23 U-S.C. §§ 104 et seq.
Laws 1965, ch. 131, § 15, amended sections 26-15-5 and 26-15-6. Section 16 was
omitted from the 1965 act and section 17,
a repealing clause, is set out under section
26*15-6.
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ADDENDUM B
ARTICLE III - APPEALS
Rules of the Merit System Council, August 28, 1974

State of Utah

MERIT SYSTEM
PROCEDURE:
Adopted By The State Personnel Director
And
The Utah State Merit System Council

As Amended August 28, L974
I s s u e d by the
PERSONNEL DIVISION
of the
D e p a r t m e n t of Finance
Salt L a k e City, U t a h 84114.
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ARTlClfe III - APPEALS
Section 1. Hearings by the M e i i t System Council - - Examinations and R e g i s t e r s
Paragraph 1.
Upon receipt of a written request for a hearing by the
Council in matters pertaining to the establishment and maintenance of r e g i s t e r s or other operation of the Merit S y s t e m within an agency, an appeal f r o m
examination rejection or examination rating, or removal from the register^
the Council shall make a review and submit its decision in writing to the person
:s s
making the appeal and to the "ag^mry?—
*- ^i.
Section 2. Hearings by the M^rit S y s t e m Council - Discrimination, D i s m i s s a l ,
Suspension, Demotion, Reassignment or Separation Due to a
R e d u c t i o n of F o r c e
Paragraph 1.

Procedure* P r i o r to Hearings

a.
Upon r^ceip- of notice of appeal from discrimination, d i s m i s s a l s
suspension, demotion, reassignment, or separation due to r e d u c t i o n s !
force f r o m an employes, the Merit S y s t e m Director shall notify the j n t g r estefl agency of the notice no later than three workdays after receipt of
the notice.
~
b.
The appellant shall include in his appeal a short statement which
may include statements of-denial of charges, mitigation, extenuating c i r c u m stances, or such other information, statements, or c l a i m s a s may lend
support to his appeal. He shall advise the Merit System Director of any
w i t n e s s e s whom he expects to introduce at the hearing in support of his
appeal, and whether he intends to present his c a s e personally or through...
a representative. The appellant shall be responsible for notifying such w i t n e s s e s of the time and pl&ce ox^thenKea"ririgI
"
•-—*

_

c.
Within three workdays after the receipt of the appeal, the Merit
System Director- shall-tranfi'nnitjtcLiJie interested a g e n c i e s ^ copy of^the
statement.
d.
Within three workdays after the receipt of the appeal, the agency
shall transmit to the Merit S y s t e m Director a statement of the cause of the
action which has been appealed. This statement should be short, but i n
sufficient detail as to present all of the pertinent facts. Within this period
the agency shall also advise the Merit System Director of any w i t n e s s e s it
expects to introduce at the hearing in support of its action, The-agency
shall be responsible for notifying such w i t n e s s e s of the t i m e and place of
the hearing,
'
——
e.
At least 4 workdays in advance of the hearing, the Merit System
Director shall:
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(1)
Notify the appellant and the agency by t e l e p h o n £ j ) £ b y m a i l
of the t i m e and' place the hearing; isTto" be'heldT
(2)
Furnish each m e m b e r of the Council with the agency's reasons
for i t s ' a c t i o n s / a n d a copy of the appellant's letter appealing such actions.:.
Paragraph 2.
Procedure at the Hearings - Introductory Statement - - The
following procedure is intended to be a guide for the conduct of the hearing in an
orderly manner. It is not fixed in the s e n s e that it will be allowed to interfere
with the purpose of the hearing - to bring out all the facts. The appellant may
present his c a s e personally or through a representative of his choice. The
hearing shall not be bound either by legal procedures or by legal rules of e v i dence. A verbatim record shall be kept of the proceedings. Reference to the
hearing and the Council's decision and recommendations shall be entered in the
minutes of the next Council meeting.
a.
The Council Chairman shall open the hearing by naming the
parties and stating the nature of the action of the agency.
b.

Presentation of the agency's c a s e .

(1)
When requested by the chairman, the agency r e p r e s e n t a t i v e shall read the agency's letter to the employee. Upon completion
of the reading, the agency representative may make such other oral
statements or offer such other evidence a s he may consider n e c e s s a r y
to supplement the statement.
(2)
When the agency representative has finished with his o r a l
statements or has stated that he has none to make, he may introduce
w i t n e s s e s or material evidence in support- of the agency's action.
(3) . At the c l o s e of the agency representative's o r a l statements
and the testimony or evidence offered by agency w i t n e s s e s , questions
may be directed to the representative and each witness by interested
parties. Interested Parties a r e a s follows, and they shall r a i s e
questions in the order named and at t i m e s called upon by the chairman,
(a)
The agency representative, on the testimony and
evidence of agency w i t n e s s e s ; and agency w i t n e s s e s , on the
testimony and evidence of the representative and of each other
witne s s.
(b)
The appellant, on the testimony and evidence offered
by the agency representative and each agency w i t n e s s . Questions
of the appeallant at this point should be aimed at focusing the
attention of the Council on what he considers to be w e a k n e s s e s of
the agency's position or on points that he will make later when
presenting his c a s e . THIS IS NOT THE PROPER PLACE FOR
PTTT^TTTTAT O P r r m N T ^13 A R G U M E N T S .
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(c)
The Merit System Director, on the testimony and evidence of the agency representative and each agency w i t n e s s ,
(d)
Council, on the testimony of and evidence offered by
the agency representative and each witness,
(4)
P r i o r to closing the presentation of the agency's c a s e , the
Council shall call for questions or statements by any interested parties
concerning the c a s e of the agency. (Note: The purpose of this step is
to allow presentation of testimony or evidence not previously presented
in the foregoing procedure. )
c.
Presentation of the appellant's c a s e - - The procedure h e r e shall
be exactly the same as that for presentationof the c a s e of the agency except
that the roles of the agency representative and w i t n e s s e s and those of the
appellant and his w i t n e s s e s shall be reversed.
d.
Before closing the c a s e , the Council shall allow the appellant
and agency representative in turn to make closing statements.
Paragraph 3.
The Council shall make a written s u m m a r y of the hearing
and prepare its decision and recommendations, all of which shall be submitted
to the interested parties. Such decision shall be made within 10 days after the
date of the hearing. Decision of the Council shall be final.

ARTICLE IV - APPOINTMENTS
Section 1.

F o r m UP 31 - Request for Certification of Eligibles

(See instructions on Form)
Section 2.

F o r m U P 32 - Inquiry Regarding Availability for Appointment

( S e e instructions on Form)
Section 3,

F o r m U P 33 - Notice of P e r s o n n e l Action

(See instructions on Form)
Section 4.
Paragraph 1.
'Persons who fail to appear for interview, fail to a n s w e r an
availability notice or fail to give adequate information requested in writing may
be considered as not available in any position, in any county or at any salary.
Section 5.

P a y r o l l Exceptions

Paragraph 1.

The Merit S y s t e m Director shall take exception to payroll

ADDENDUM C
In the Matter of the Appeal of Stanley J. Konkol
MSC 78-5 (1978)

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE MERIT SYSTEM COUNCIL
In the Matter of the

)

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONSLUSIONS

Appeal of

)

OF LAW AND DECISION

STANLEY J. KONKOL

)

MSC -

"7J$? ~*$

This matter came on regularly for hearing before the above
entitled Council on the 30th day of March, 1978, pursuant to the
appeal of Stanley J. Konkol

(hereinafter "Appellant") from his dis-

missal from the State Youth Development Center

(hereinafter "Agency").

Appellant was present and was represented by his counsel, Randall R.
Smart.

The Agency was represented by Dennis Ritz, Tommy Smith and

counsel, Stephen G. Schwendiman of the Attorney General's office.
Council members Anthony L. Rampton, Mrs. 0. N. Malmquist, Orlando
A. Riveria, Howard W. Knight and Mrs. Marguerite Horton were present.
Oral testimony and documentary evidence were presented to
the Council and the Council being duly advised in the premises makes
and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Appellant during all times material hereto was

employed by the Agency as a Security Officer/Security Driver.
2.

In such capacity Appellant is charged, among others,

with the following duties and responsibilities:
(a)

He must be mentally alert at all times to security

(b)

He must be able to chase, apprehend, and hold

problems.

attempted AWOLs.
(c)

He must give support and backup in every situation

where there is a problem and an emergency call goes out.
(d)

He must be ready, willing and able to give sup-

port to any staff member that may call for assistance in handling
emergency problems (disciplinary, assaultive, attempts to escape,
riots, or any other disruptive problems), and

(e)

He must give loyalty in support to other members

of the security force.
3.

During the week of October 17, 1977, Appellant was found

asleep in his car while on duty.
4.

Appellant removed and destroyed official papers from

the desk of Mr. Horace Hood, Chief Security Officer, which were prepared for the purpose of discussing with Appellant certain inefficiencies in his performance as a Security Officer.
5.

On January 6, 1978, Appellant allowed students to es-

cape by not intervening to stop students who were attempting to
escape and failed to pursue the students following their escape.
6.

On January 6, 1978, Appellant failed to assist and give

support to other staff members during a disturbance in the cafeteria.
7.

On January 27, 1978, Appellant was informed in writing

by the Agency of the aforementioned deficiencies in his performance
and asked to give reasons why he should not be terminated.
8.

On January 30, 1978, the Agency held a hearing at

which Appellant was asked to respond to the charges against him.
9.

By letter dated January 30, 1978, the Agency terminated

Appellant from his employment effective January 31, 1978.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Council makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Appellant, in his position of Security Officer/Security

Driver, State Youth Development Center, comes within the Utah State
Merit System and, therefore, is subject and entitled to all the
protections, rules and regulations provided by said system.
2.

Under the provisions of Section 67-13-14 (a), Utah Code

Annotated (1953), Merit System employees may be dismissed for reasons
of inefficiency, insubordination, or nonfeasance in office.
3.

Under the provisions of Section 67-13-14(b), Utah Code

Annotated (1953), in any appeal from a charge of inefficiency,
where the charge is supported by credible evidence, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Agency, with the burden of proof

4.

Based upon the evidence presented, there is sufficient

credible evidence to support the Agency's charge of Appellant's inefficiency, and the Appellant has failed to rebut the presumption
which arises therefrom.
5.

Based upon the evidence presented, Appellant's dismis-

sal by the Agency for reasons of inefficiency, insubordination and
nonfeasance in office is supported by the evidence and was, therefore, justified and should be upheld.
OPINION
At the beginning of the hearing of this appeal the question
was raised by counsel for Appellant as to whether the period given
by the Agency to the Appellant to respond at the Agency hearing to
the charges against him was legally sufficient.

As indicated in

the aforementioned Findings of Fact, the written notice of charges
was received by Appellant on Friday, January 27, 1978, and the hearing before the Agency head was held the following Monday, January 30,
1978.
Section 67-13-14(c), Utah Code Annotated

(1953), provides

that:
"Except in aggravated cases of misconduct, no person
shall be demoted or dismissed from a tenure position without the following procedures:
(1) Notification in writing by the department head
of the reasons for discharge.
(2) The employee shall have an opportunity to reply
and have his reply considered by his department head.
(3) An opportunity to be heard by his department head
or designated representatives.
(4) Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the department head finds adequate cause
or reason.
(5) If the department head finds that retention of any
employee would endanger the peace and safety of others or
pose a grave threat to the public interest, such employee
may be summarily suspended pending administrative hearings
and merit system council review."
A s is apparent, the above quoted provisions provide no
guidance with respect to the question of the period of time required between the notification in writing of the reasons for discharge

and the opportunity to reply and be heard.

The Council, however,

believes that such period of time must be reasonable in light of
the circumstances surrounding the dismissal.

Certainly, in most

instances, three days including a weekend would not be reasonable.
However, for the reasons stated below, it is the Council's opinion
that in this rather limited factual situation the notification was
reasonable.
Appellant is a Security Officer at the State Youth Development Center which is essentially a correction and rehabilitation
facility for minors.

Testimony during the hearing made it apparent

that there exists at the facility a substantial concern for security.
At times circumstances and events threaten the health and safety of
both students and staff.

Under these circumstances it is essential

that all Security Officers strictly adhere to the written "Exceptions" (including those appearing in the Findings of Fact) which
are part of their job description.

Failure to adhere to these expect-

ations immediately places the safety of others in danger.
The herein-quoted statutory language provides that if the
retention of an employee "would endanger the peace and safety of
others" the employee may be summarily suspended pending administrative hearings and Merit Council review.

While this provision does

not directly touch upon the issue of notice timing, the Council
feels that it does imply a legislative intent to expedite dismissal
proceedings wherein the peace and safety of others are endangered.
Since the peace and safety of others were endangered by Appellant's
actions or failure to act, and since the notice was followed by a
thorough hearing before the Agency head, the Council feels that the
notice provided was reasonable.

Again, however, we stress that

under most circumstances such notice would be unreasonably short.
It is the decision of the Council, that based upon the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appellant was
justifiedly terminated by the Agency for reasons of inefficiency,
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insubordination and nonfeasance.

Therefore/ the decision of the

Agency terminating Appellant is hereby upheld and affirmed.
DATED this 10th day of April, 1978.
UTAH STATE MERIT SYSTEM COUNCIL

By /k^L

rS/fe^lz^

Anthony yi Ramptpn, Chairman
DECISION UNANIMOUS
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ADDENDUM D
Rule 20.0 - SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A HEARING
Personnel Review Board, 1981

UTAH PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD

STATE EMPLOYEES'
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL
PROCEDURES
1981 EDITION

The statutory basis for the Utah State Employees1 Grievance and Appeal
Procedures is set forth in the Utah Personnel Management Act, which originated
as Senate Bill 179 (1979)• That act became effective July 1, 1979. Senate
Bill 73, enacted in the 1980 legislative session, provided relevant amendments
to the original bill; and in 1981 Senate Bill 271 made further provision for
amendments essential to the grievance and appeals process. Statutory
references may be found at § 67-19-18, §§ 67-19-20 through 67-19-25 and
§ 67-19-29, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and in the corresponding
annual volumes of Laws of Utah.

presentation of the case by the party present.
19.3 - If a requested witness does not appear at the hearing, such
failure shall not necessitate the postponement of any proceedings.
19.4 affirmation.

The testimony of witnesses shall be under oath or

19.5 - The Executive Secretary as well as the Hearing Officer have
been granted authority by statute to subpoena witnesses at the Step 5
hearing.
19.6 - If additional witnesses are to be called which were not
identified at a Pre-hearing Conference, they shall be identified to the
opposing party and to the Hearing Officer at the onset of the hearing.

20.0

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A HEARING
20.1 - Upon commencement, the Hearing Officer shall announce that
the hearing is convened and shall direct the reading into the record of
the original grievance issue, and will note for the record all subpoenas
issued and all appearances.
20.2 - The State shall bear the burden of proof in all appeals
resulting from dismissals, demotions, suspensions and other disciplinary
actions. The Employee shall bear the burden of proof in all other
appeals. (§ 67-19-25(5) UCA)
20.3 - The Hearing Officer has discretionary authority to
determine which party shall proceed first with the case. Witnesses may
be cross-examined. All exhibits offered by and in behalf of the Agency
shall be marked in consecutive numerical order.
20.4 - The Appellant's evidence shall be presented in the same
manner as the Agency's evidence, with witnesses and exhibits. Each of
the Appellant's exhibits will be marked in consecutive numerical order.
20.5 - Opening statements may be made, and each of the parties may
offer rebuttal evidence within the discretion of and/or by order of the
Hearing Officer.
20.6 - Closing statements, at the conclusion of the presentation
of evidence, may be made by the representative or counsel for both
parties. No rebuttal statements may be made by either of the parties at
the proceedings' conclusion. As appropriate, the time for oral argument
may be limited by the Hearing Officer.
20.7 - After all proceedings have been concluded, the Hearing
Officer will dismiss and/or excuse witnesses and declare the hearing
closed. Either party may tender written briefs to the Hearing Officer
within a time limit specified by the latter. If briefs are to be
submitted, the record will remain open until such time as the briefs are
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received and thus incorporated into the record. Then, the Hearing
Officer will declare that his or her decision will be announced within
due and proper time following consideration of all matters presented at
the hearing.
20.8 - The Hearing Officer, following the full and complete
hearing, will make and enter a written decision and order containing
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Such decision and order will be
filed by the Hearing Officer with the Personnel Review Board Executive
Secretary and will, without further action, become the decision and order
of the Board as a result of the hearing.
20.9

21.0

-

The Hearing Officer shall determine the quantum of proof.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE
21.1 - Prior to every hearing, the Agency is to designate its
representative who is entitled to remain throughout the hearing to
represent the Agency at any proceeding. Neither the Employee nor the
Agency representative shall be excluded. The Department Head or Agency
Director, or designate, may represent the Agency during the hearing.

ADDENDUM E
Utah Admin. Code R140-1-20.C (1989)

Administrative Rules Of The
Career Service Review Board
R140-M through R140-1-22

Issued pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated %67-19a-203 (Supp. 1989)

Effective December 15, 1989

Capitol Hill
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

R140-1-19 PUBLIC HEARINGS
The parties shall be entitled to an open and public hearing unless the exclusionary rule
is invoked or unless there are reasonable grounds to justify an executive session.
A.

Closing Hearings All grievance procedure hearings shall be open to the public, except
for situations in which the administrator, the board, or the hearing officer closes by
executive session either a portion of the hearing or the entire hearing, when
substantial reason exists for not having an open hearing.
1. An evidentiary/step 5 hearing may be closed in part or in its entirety when the
proceeding involves questions about an employee's character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health.
2. Authority to close meetings is set forth in the Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act, §52-4-5(1).

B.

Sealing Evidence The administrator, the board, or the hearing officer may exercise
authority to seal the record when circumstances so warrant.

C.

Media Presence All hearings at the evidentiary/step 5 and appellate/step 6 levels
are open to the media, unless otherwise closed due to R140-1-19A above, except that
television cameras shall not be permitted at the evidentiary/step 5 proceedings.

D. Dissemination The administrator has discretion to release copies of legal decisions,
orders, and rulings to a media representative upon the latter's request. Portions of
or entire legal decisions and orders may be withheld if deemed to be of a privileged
or confidential nature, or if the record is sealed.
R140-1-20 EVIDENTIARY/STEP 5 HEARINGS
A. Authority of Hearing Officers The hearing officer is empowered to:
1. maintain order, insure the development of a clear and complete record, rule
upon offers of proof, and receive relevant evidence;
2. set reasonable limits on repetitive and cumulative testimony and exclude any
witness whose later testimony might be colored by the testimony of another
witness or any person whose presence might have a chilling effect on another
testifying witness;
3. rule on motions, exhibit lists, and proposed findings;
4. require the filing of memoranda of law and the presentation of oral argument
with respect to any question of law;
5. compel testimony and order the production of evidence and the appearance of
witnesses; and
6. admit evidence that has reasonable and probative value.

B.

Conduct of Hearings A hearing shall be confined to those issues related to the
subject matter presented in the original grievance statement.
1. An evidentiary proceeding shall not be allowed to develop into a general inquiry
into the policies and operations of an agency.
2. An evidentiary proceeding is intended solely for the purpose of receiving
evidence which either refutes or substantiates specific claims or charges. It shall
not be made an occasion for irresponsible accusations, general attacks upon the
character or conduct of the employing agency or the employee or others, or for
making derogatory assertions having no bearing on the claims or specific matters
under review.

C. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new hearing
for the record, with both parties being accorded full administrative due process. The
hearing officer shall give latitude and deference to an agency's prior decision when
the latter is supported by the findings of fact based on the evidence.
D. Discretion Upon commencement, the hearing officer shall announce that the hearing
is convened and is henceforth on the record. The hearing officer shall note
appearances for the record and shall determine which party has the burden of
moving forward.
E.

Closing of the Record After all testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments
have been presented, the hearing officer shall close the record and terminate the
proceeding, unless one or both parties agree to submit a posthearing brief within a
specified time.

R

Posthearing Briefs When posthearing briefs or memoranda of law are scheduled to
be submitted, the record shall remain open until the briefs are received by the
hearing officer and incorporated into the record, or until the time to receive such
briefs has expired. After receipt of posthearing documents, or upon the expiration
of the time to receive posthearing documents, the case is then taken under
advisement, and the tolling period commences for the issuance of the written
decision.

G. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Following the closing of the record, the hearing
officer shall make and enter a written decision containing findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The decision and order is filed with the administrator and
without further action becomes the decision and order of the evidentiary hearing.
H. Disseminating Decisions The administrator shall disseminate copies of the decision
and order to the persons of record for each party.
I.

Past Work Record In those proceedings where a disciplinary penalty is at issue, the
past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of either mitigating
or sustaining the penalty in the event that the employee is found guilty of the
disciplinary charge alleged.

J.

Scope of Remedy/Relief If the hearing officer finds that the action complained of
which was taken by the appointing authority was too severe, even though for good
cause, the hearing officer may provide for such other remedy or relief as deemed
appropriate and in the best interest of the respective parties.

K.

Compliance and Enforcement State agencies and officials are expected to comply
with decisions and orders issued by a hearing officer, unless an appeal is taken to the
appellate/step 6 level. Enforcement measures available to the board include:
(1) involving the governor, who may remove most state officers with or without
cause, and with respect to those who can only be removed for cause, refusal to obey
a lawful order may constitute sufficient cause for removal; (2) a mandamus order
to compel the official to obey the order; and (3) the charge of a Class A
misdemeanor.

L.

No Rehearings Rehearings are not permitted.

M. Reconsideration A request for a reconsideration may be made in writing within ten
working days after the date that an evidentiary/step 5 decision is received by the
party. The written request is to contain specific reasons as to why a reconsideration
is warranted with respect to the factual findings and conclusions of the
evidentiary/step 5 decision. The original hearing officer shall decide on the propriety
of a reconsideration. A request for reconsideration is filed with the administrator.
Any appeal to the board from a reconsideration by the original hearing officer must
be filed with the administrator within ten working days upon receipt of the
reconsideration.
67-19a-407. Appeal to Career Service Review Board.
(1)

(a) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on a grievance to the board
if:
(i)

the appealing party files a notice of appeal with the administrator within ten working days
after the receipt of the decision or the expiration of the period for decision, whichever is first;
and

(ii)

the appealing party meets the requirements for appeal established in Subsection (2).

(b) The appealing party shall submit a copy of the official transcript of the hearing to the administrator.
(2)

The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on a grievance to the board only
if the appealing party alleges that:
(a) the hearing officer did not issue a decision within 20 working days after the hearing adjourned;
(b) the appealing party is dissatisfied with the decision;
(c) the appealing party believes that the decision was based upon an incorrect or arbitrary interpretation
of the facts; or
(d) the appealing party believes that the hearing officer made an erroneous conclusion of law.

67-19a-408. Career Service Review Board hearing • Evidentiary and procedural rules.
(1)

The board shall:

ADDENDUM F
Jerry Fisher v. Adult Probation and Parole, 1 PRB/H.O. 1 (1979)

BEFORE THE PJEfc§9SN£L REVIEW BOARD HEARING OFFICER

IN THE HATTER OF THE APPEAL
of JERRY R~ FISHER

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECISION

HO 7<M
3&is matter came 3>efore the duly assigned Hearing Officer as a regularly
scheduled hearing on Xhe first day of Hovember, 1979* -pursuant to the appeal of
"Mr. Jerry ^* *isher <hereinafter ^Appellant") *ram M s dismissal as a Probation
and Parole Officer, Division of Corrections (Hereinafter "Agency")- Appellant
was present and represented by his attorney, Brent X* Johns

and Hr. Tom

HantrelX. The Agency was represented by £arl Dorins of the Office of the Utah
Attorney General.
Oral testimony and -documentary evidence vere presented to the Hearing Office
at that time which included a Zape recording of a lover level departmental Administrative hearing held April 24, 1979, and the findings, conclusions^and decision
of the hearing officer* This Hearing Officer being duly advised in the premises,
makes and ente-r* the following findings of fic^, cwc? •**'*«•*«* *** 1**? r*»d decisior:
PIND'iTOS OF PACT
1. The Appellant at the time of his terminat£o&^R&s~ employed by * the Agency
as a Probation and Parole Officer, Grade 21*
2«

On or about March 14, 1979, a meeting was held between the appellant am
representatives of the Agency concerning his performance as a probation
officer, at the conclusion of which Appellant was informed that he shou
either resign or he would be terminated from his position*

3* On or about March 19, 1979, Appellant contacted a representative of the
Agency and indicated that he would not submit his resignation.
4* D n c r about Harch 19, 1979, Appellant was informed that he had been tei
urinated and the Agency prepared an "Employee Termination Form which
listed the reason for termination as '"unsatisfactory performance*'*
5. On or about Harch 19, 1979, Appellant notified the Agency, in writing t
his desire to appeal the decision to terminate and requested the Agenc
provide him with a list -of specific allegations*

6. On or about March 23, 2979, the Agency sent Appellant written notificatio
of his right to appeal the termination in an administrative hearing bef or
the Division of Corrections prior to his requested Merit System Council
Hearing and Included copies of his Termination Form, separation notice,
leave slip, and requested allegations*
7. On or about April 19, 1979, Appellant was contacted hy the Agency and
-advised that he had been reinstated with the Agency, that he would be
£iven back pay and that an administrative hearing would be held en April
,24, 1979, to appeal the Agency's decision to terminate.
3. On or about April 24, 1979, Appellant was present at an Administrative
Hearing before the Division of Corrections and given the opportunity to
present his grievance and respond to the reasons given for the Agency's
Intent to dismiss him*
S. On or about April 30, 1979, the Administrative Hearing Officer issued a
decision which upheld the Agency's requested action and terminated
Appellant as a Probation and Parole Officer. The decision of the Hearing
Officer, issued on or about April 30, 1979, was subsequently modified in
that Appellant's termination date was effective June 19, 1979.
10.

On or about May 29, 1979, Appellant requested in writing, a hearing bef or
the State Merit System Council to appeal the Hearing Officer's decision.

U.

Delays and postponements of a hearing before the Merit System Council as
well as passage of the State Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Annotate
1953 SeSion 67-19-1, et seq., which came into effect on July 1, 1979,
resulted in this matter coming before this Hearing Cfficer rather than tl
Merit ^Council ^as directed by the newly established grievance procedure*

12. The reasons given for Appellant*s dismissal involved charges of misfeasance, unsatisfactory performance, malfeasance, nonfeasance and misconduct while in office, which occurred, primarily, between November 13,
1978 and March 13, 1979, in that Appellants
<a) bailed to properly proceed with a work release order granted
by a circuit court judge on a Steven Bailey;
4jb} 4ki or .about December A-, 1978, -was contacted by an agent of
*he Salt Xake Probation Office, «fced to -aid in an interdistric

presentence report and do a c o l l a t e r a l c o n t a c t , which was part c
Appellant's j o b assignment, and i n d i c a t e d an u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o
comply with the request$
(c)

Cn or about February 5 , 2979, requested permission from h i s
supervisor t o attend a J o b - r e l a t e d seminar with the understands
that

h i s work assignments were completed f o r t h a t time period

and that i t was subsequently discovered t h a t two presentence r e
p o r t s had n o t been completed f o r t h a t time p e r i o d ;
Cd) On o r about T«bruary 3 , 1 9 7 9 , was a s s i g n e d t o cover" Layton
Circuit Court, phoned t h e Agency t o r e p o r t an i l l n e s s a f t e r
the Court had contacted t h e Agency -to r e p o r t t h e absence of
a required a g e n t , talked with a s e c r e t a r y , not h i s s u p e r v i s o r ,
and could mot be reached a t h i s home l a t e r I n t h e day when
t h e Agency attempted t o c o n t a c t him;
<e)

J a i l e d to use the Agency s i g n - o u t board, making i t

difficult

for the Agency s e c r e t a r i e s t o schedule appointments for him
or l o c a t e him once he l e f t the o f f i c e ;
(f)

On or about March 12, 1 9 / 9 , contacted t h e Agency, spoke w i t h a
secretary and indicated that he would not b e i n the o f f i c e untj
Harch 14.

Appellant was asked i f h e ' d l i k e t o -talk t o h i s supt

v i s o r , a s employee r e g u l a t i o n s r e q u i r e t h a t annual l e a v e must 1
approved by a supervisor before t a k e n , and he declined t o do s<
(g)

Tailed to complete a presentence r e p o r t on Eldon Bailey due i n
Bountiful Circuit Court on March 9 , 1979, i n order f o r t h e judj
t o ^review the recommendations p r i o r t o s e n t e n c i n g on March 1 2 ;

OO T a i l e d t o s i g n and d e l i v e r a presentence report t o h i s s u p e r v i
for h i s signature and approval on Barbara Von K o l l i n p r i o r t o
sentencing before the C l e a r f i e l d C i r c u i t Court;
(i)

On or about March 1 2 , 1979, f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t himself t o t h e
layton Circuit Court t o review and make recommendation i n t h e
case of Charles Mormon;

(j)

On or about November 1978, was s i n g l e d out by Judge Browning i
communication t o Appellant*s s u p e r v i s o r a s a d i f f i c u l t I n d i v i d

(k)

In the opinion of Judge Thornley Swan, a s communicated t o
Appellant's supervisor on or about February 2 7 , 1979, was overl:
p u n i t i v e i n h i s recommendations and p o s s e s s e d questionable
a b i l i t y I n making d e c i s i o n s from m a t e r i a l s h e ' d gathered; and

(1)

In t h e opinion of three a t t o r n e y s , George Duimenti, Steven Oda,
and John Hutchinson, had d e a l t w i t h t h e i r c l i e n t s i n an unneede
Judgmental manner, drawn conclusions w i t h o u t evidence and
g e n e r a l l y a l i e n a t e d many of t h e s e -individuals •

J3.

From a period beginning on or about September 1 6 , 1 9 7 6 , through. October
1978, Appellant received standard, s a t i s f a c t o r y and above standard evalua t i o n s on Ills Employee Ferf ormance Appraisal (UP-17) done by t h e Agency,
t h e l a s t appraisal being s a t i s f a c t o r y for t h e p e r i o d November 1 6 , 1977
through October 1978.

14.

Appellant's Employee Performance Appraisal (UP-17) f o r November 1978
through March 1 5 , 1979 was unsatisfactory w i t h a recommendation f o r
termination.

15.

Prior to Appellant's meeting with h i s supervisor and another reprcsentat^
of the Agency on or about March 1 4 , 1979, Appellant was not s p e c i f i c a l l y
warned that h i s a c t i o n s would r e s u l t i n termination w i t h the Agency.

16.

Appellant was verbalfyinformed of h i s s u p e r v i s o r ' s d i s p l e a s u r e over

certi

of the acts d e t a i l e d i n Paragraph 12 of these f i n d i n g s .
17.

Appellant received some professional and supervisory counseling i n 1977
and 1978, and t h i s was known by Appellant's s u p e r v i s o r , but not r e f l e c t e
i n h i s UP-17 Appraisal through October 1978.

From the foregoing Findings of F a c t , t h e Hearing O f f i c e r makes and -enters
t h e following:
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
X.

Appellant, i n h i s p o s i t i o n a s Probation and P a r o l e O f f i c e r , Grade 2 1 ,
D i v i s i o n of Corrections came under the P r o v i s i o n s o f t h e S t a t e Personnel
Management Act^ which replaced the Utah S t a t e *{erit System as of J u l y 1,
1979, and therefore i s subject t o and e n t i t l e d t o a l l the p r o t e c t i o n
r u l e s and regulations provided by that Act which incorporates protectior
* and r i g h t s afforded employees under the Utah S t a t e Merit System*

"2.

tinder the s t a t u t o r y and regulatory p r o v i s i o n s c o n t r o l l i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n
of "the Merit System (repealed July 1 , 1979) and the Utah State Personne

from their department heads or designated Teprcscauiux»w «-ww^*.M*n&
the reasons for discharge, an opportunity to reply to such charges (under
the Management Act the time period specified is five working days) , and
have the reply considered by the department head, and an opportunity
:to be heard by the department head before the employee may be dismissed
or otherwise terminated.
3. Under the provision of Section 67-19-18 (1), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
which incorporates tne substance of Section 67-13-14 under the repealed
Jierlt System, dismissals shall be only to advance the good 0 f t|ie public
service, or for -such causes as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to main
-tain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty
-Jto orders of a "superior, misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance In
office.
4. Based upon the evidence presented, Appellant's dismissal by the Agency
.for reason of unsatisfactory performance, nonfeasance, and failure to
tnalntatn skills or adequate performance levels was justified and shall
l>e upheld*
DECISION
This case been presented several difficult problems relating to both substance
and procedure. Tirst with respect to procedure, the actual hearing of this matter
before the instant Hearing Officer occurred approximately seven and one-half months
after Appellant was notified of his initial termination. This inordinate prolongation is a direct result of a number of factors, the first of which was the
Agency's apparent failure to initially comply with Appellant's right to receive
written notification of the reasons for discharge before termination. Appellant
did not receive written notification at either the March 14, 1979, meeting or on
March 19, 1979, when the Agency prepared his Employment Termination Form.
This procedural defect was subsequently corrected when Appellant was mailed
a copy of the reasons for discharge on March 23, 1979, and then -notified by the
Agency, on or about April 19, 1979, that he Tiad been reinstated and could appeal
the Agency's intent to dismiss in a departmental administrative hearing scheduled
for April 24, 1979. Appellant appeared at the April 24th Hearing and was re r
presented by Tom Cantrell. Appellant was given the opportunity to present his
grievance at that time* The Hearing Officer, in an opinion issued six* days later,
upheld the Agency's intent to terminate and the Appellant appealed this decision
to the Merit System Council. Belays occurred in scheduling the requested hearing
before the Council and, in the interim, the Merit appeal procedure was replaced
by the State Tersonnel Management Act which further delayed the appeal process.

Now that the new grievance procedure is operational* it is the belief of this
Hearing Officer that grievances will be resolved more expeditiously*
Appellant has complained of other possible violations of procedural due process by the Agency* He indicated that he had not received any warning or indicatio
of termination prior to his March 14th Meeting with his supervisor*

Appellant's

immediate supervisor did indicate, however, that on various occasions he met with
Appellant wand advised him of complaints and deficiencies in Appellant's job performance. During ^the course of the hearing -It became apparent that written notification of conduct which could result -±a dismissal, other than that notification
prescribed by the Management Act. is not a standard practice of the Agency*

The

Agency dsfnot required by law or regulation to give such warnings but this Hearing
Officer xecommends that Jtfie Agency consider the implementation of some such prograi
*r, >at -the very least, written documentation of discussion with employees on performance deficiencies or related problems*
Turning to the substance of this appeal, this officer is confronted with the
problem of an employee who received standard or above standard performance apprais.
from September 1976 through late October or early November of 1978* His last appraisal, which extended from November 1978 through March 1979 * was unsatisfactory
and the events which occurred during that period of time were the primary reasons
given for his dismissal by the Agency. It is not the intent of this Officer to
second guess the actions taken by the Agency. However, other disciplinary action
could well have been considered, i.e. placement of the Appellant on conditional st
for a period of time, demotion, etc., and utilized prior to the Agency's notification of its intent to dismiss the Appellant. This recommended action is not a
specific requirement under present state rules and regulations but certainly seems
consistent and appropriate within the spirit and purpose of :the Personnel
Management Act*

In order to handle performance problems In an efficient and

effective way, the Agency would do well to consider the implementation of some
such program, adaptable to the particular needs of both the Agency and its
employees.
Appellant did not actively dispute the fact that the events complained of
did or could have occurred as presented by the Agency. On more than one occasion,
^during this hearing and that held by the Division of Corrections, he conceeded
-that he had made judgmental ^errors* Appellant indicated that he 4±d not view his

conduct as unsatisfactory .and that no such indication was.
until the 4iate of the March 14th meeting.

A brief review of the findings dc>ps,

however, show an accumulation of 1ess than satisfactory performance by the
A pp. JLiiiiL, Appellant failed to follow proper procedures in the Bailey work
release matt ex-, Mv -clim nol complete the appropriate paper work. . He did not
notify the circuit court judge ai

that Bailey should not

given work release. In effect* !* disregarded - ^rery possibly the rights Hof Hr. Bailey*

e;

B e compounded his mistake by failing

*- <
L

communicate with his supervisor on the matter«
In *he interdistrict presentran«t> i qui it

BJIIJI

e ollateral • contact incident, Appe

lant Indicated that he was* attempting to update his case fllea piioi, fin a ! 'I IT we we
vacation and may well have rold -the agent that he was too busy Xo do the contact.
Appellant was the assigned agent for the report*

The responsibility was his and 1

•matter could simply have been resolved by Appellant requesting one of the other
-agents

HI IIJ.J

oilier in h;iinlli« the lu.jftex or informing his supervisor that he was

too busy l"i ile it hut tiui il needed ir 1 • taken
Appellant failed to complete two pre-sentence reports that vere due while he
i

*

t

t ;

i

%

related seminar, work t'u*r Fhould have heei' comnleted prior t
notified his supervisoi or asked some other a

these matter

*r

•,

nr I aid luy l he ji.uminar,tonI ht.: failed to do s

The Layton court incident presents another instance when Appellant should ha
exercised more sound -jucigppnt , He lett the court, ill, on February 5, 1979, at
approximately Hi uB „i in wnnouf contacting his office, thereby making no provisd
for a replacement-

Subsequent I y, hi (or" nice! the office, after the Court bod

-called and complained, told a secretary hu was ill, .and would not be in lor i. tie
rest of the day.. Appellant made mo attempt to talk with his supervisor at that
time and unsuccessful.attempts were made in an effort to contact him at his home
lal.fi In t he day*
Appellant's supervisor was notified by one ol the oil:ice secretaries I.IiaL t
Appellant was not. conscientious in using the sign-out boardt making it, difficult
schedule appointments.

Appellant failed to con,tact his supervisor and olitfaiii

advance clearance, for annual leave which he took on March .12, 13 and the morning
.March'l 4th

kppel larif's super v isor testified that the Agency 1 s policy is that i

annual leave must be cleared in advance with an employee's supervisors*

When

tHe Appellant called the Agency on March 12, he compounded his mistake by declining to talk -with his supervisor at that time* His absence resulted in his
failure to complete presentence reports on Eldon Bailey and Barbara Von Kollin.
Be also missed an -appearance in Court in the case of Charles Mormon*

No attempt

-was made -to tell his supervisor or fellow workers that these matters needed
.attention.
The-remaining charges stem from complaints, letters and .conversations with
judges and attorneys relating to their dealings with Appellant on a professional
basis. In ills defense, Appellant lias submitted numerous letters from professionals
whom he dealt with during the course of his employment, with the Agency* The
Agency's charges Indicate Appellant's problem In dealing with judges and attorneys
while Appellant's exhibits reflect positive associations with other professionals
Appellant had to deal with*

These have been appropriately weighed and considered

by this Hearing Officer*
As noted above, the Appellant Indicated that even though he had made some
mistakes and judgment errors, they certainly did not justify his termination
nor was he even warned that any of these instances would lead to his dismissal*
If each incident could be isolated and viewed separately, then perhaps a
strong case could be made for just such an argument, at least in regards to some
of the Agency's reasons for dismissal. However, it is the view of this Officer
that the reasons given by the Agency, in their totality, are sufficient to warrant
dismissal. The Appellant's supervisor testified that on several occasions he had
counseled with the Appellant in regard to liis job performance. Testimony was alsc
given that some .attempts were made at professional counseling*
Therefore, it is the decision of this Hearing Officer, that based upon the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appellant was justifiedly
terminated by the Agency for reasons of unsatisfactory performance, nonfeasance*
and failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels*

Therefore, the

decision of the Agency terminating Appellant is hereby upheld and affirmed*

DATED this 13th day of December, 1979.. By
Jaraesr h\ Wilson, Hearing Examiner
for the/
Dnrennnnl

lJoviGW

Board

ADDENDUM G
Utah Code Ann § 67-19-25(5] (1979)
Laws of Utah 197^, Chapter 139, Section 31
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(2) A reasonable amount of time during work hours to confer with the
representative and prepare the grievance;
(3) Freedom from reprisals for use of the procedure; and
(4) Call other employees as witnesses at an appeal hearing and such
employees shall be allowed to attend and testify at the hearing if reasonable
advance notice is given to the witnesses* immediate supervisor.
Section 29. Section enacted.
Section 67-19-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read
67-19-23. Employees processing appeal—Failure to answer—Appeal
steps—Waiver for failure.
U) Failure to answer an employee's appeal within the time specified
automatically grants the aggrieved employee the right to process the appeal
to the next step.
(2) Any appeal step, or any time limits specified at any step, may be
waived or extended by mutual agreement in writing between the aggrieved
employee and the person to whom the appeal is directed.
(3) Failure to process an appeal from one step to the next step within
the time specified is deemed a waiver by the aggrieved employee of any
right to process the appeal further or to appeal to any court; the appeal
being deemed settled on the basis of the last step.
Section 30. Section enacted.
Section 67-19-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to ic ad:
67-19-24. Appeals—Limitations of actions.
(1) No appeal shall be submitted under this chapter unless (a) it is submitted within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the appeal or
(b) within 20 working days after the aggrieved employee has knowledge of
the event giving rise to the appeal.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) (b), no employee may submit an
appeal more than one year after the event giving rise to the appeal, nor
does any person who has voluntarily terminated his or her employment with
the state have any standing thereafter to submit an appeal.
Section 31. Section enacted.
Section 67-19-25, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
67-19-25. Appeals—-Procedure—Evidence—Decisions—Personnel review
board—Judicial review—Discrimination in hiring.
An aggrieved employee appealing an administrative action shall observe
the following procedural steps:
(1) An aggrieved employee shall first attempt to resolve a grievance
through discussion with the employee's immediate supervisor.

Ch. 139
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(2) If the grievance submitted under subsection (1) remains unanswered
for five working days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decisions reached, the appeal may be resubmitted in writing to the employee's immediate supervisor within five working days after
the expiration of the period for answer or receipt of the decision, whichever
is first. The immediate supervisor shall render a written decision under this
step within five working days after submission of the appeal.
The employee shall, upon submission of the appeal to the immediate
supervisor, notify the executive secretary of the personnel review board
that the employee has initiated the appeaL The executive secretary shall
upon receipt of the notification of the appeal attempt to settle the complaint
by conference, conciliation and persuasion. If the executive secretary
believes that the grievance is one that the agency does not have the authority to resolve, he may, with the concurrence of the employee and the
agency, waive the requirement for a decision by the immediate supervisor
and subsections (3) and (4) of the grievance procedure and submit the grievance directly to the hearing officer under subsection (5). He also shall
attempt to resolve the dispute by informal means with the director.
(3) If the appeal submitted under subsection (2) remains unanswered for
five working days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisifed with the decision reached, the appeal may be submitted in writing to
the employee's second level supervisor within ten working days after the
expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is
first. A written decision under this step setting forth the reasons for decision shall be rendered within five working days after submission of the
appeal.
(4)' If the appeal submitted under subsection (3) remains unanswered for
five working days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisifed with the decision reached, the appeal may be submitted in writing to
the employee's department head within ten working days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
A written decision under this step setting forth the reasons for the decision
shall be rendered within ten working days after submission of the appeaL
(5) If the appeal submitted under subsection (4) remains unanswered for
ten working days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision reached, the appeal may be submitted in writing to
the hearing officer within ten working days after the expiration of the
period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. Written
notice of the time and place for hearing shall be given to the aggrieved
employee at least five days before the date set for hearing which shall be
set not later than 15 days after submission of the grievance or at a time
agreed upon by the aggrieved employee and the hearing officer.
Informal rules of evidence and procedure are applicable at such hearings.
The aggrieved employee and employer may, in addition to the provisions of
section 67-19-22, be present at all hearings, produce witnesses, examine and
cross examine witnesses, and examine documentary evidence. A tape
recording of the proceedings shall be made and the transcript of the proceedings shall constitute the record of the hearing.
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The hearing officer shall render a written decision supported by findings
of fact and conclusions of law within 15 working days after the hearing.
(6) If no decision is rendered under subsection (5) within 15 working
days after the hearing, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with a
decision on appeal from dismissal or if the aggrieved employee or applicant
alleges that a decision of the hearing officer was based on incorrect or arbitrary interpretation of facts or that a matter of law is in dispute, the appeal
may be submitted in writing, together with a transcript of the hearing conducted under subsection (5), to the personnel review board within ten working days after the expiration of the period of decision or upon receipt of the
decision, whichever is first. Written notice of the time and place for hearing
by the board shall be given to the aggrieved employee or applicant at least
five days before the date set for the hearing which shall be held not later
than 15 days after submission of the appeal, except that in the case of an
appeal in which the aggrieved employee alleges discrimination the board
may set a date for the hearing later than 15 days after submission of the
appeal. In a hearing before the personnel review board on an appeal from a
dismissal or demotion based upon inefficiency where the charge is supported
by credible evidence, there shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
employer, except that if the employer has failed to comply with the provisions of section 67-19-18, the burden of proof and persuasion shall be upon
the employer. Evidentiary and procedural rules and rights with respect to
representation and witnesses described in subsection (5) are applicable in
hearings of the board. The board may subpoena witnesses and compel testimony in the conduct of its hearings. Hearings of the board shall be
recorded and the complete transcript of a hearing shall constitute the record
of the hearing.
The personnel review board shall render a written decision within 15
working days after the hearing. The decision of the board is binding upon
the aggrieved employee and upon the agency whose action caused the
appeal. The board may, at its discretion, order that an employee be placed
on the reappointment roster provided for in section 67-19-17 for assignment
to another agency. The aggrieved employee or the agency may appeal the
decision of the personnel review board to the district court of the district in
which the position is located or to the district court of Salt Lake County.
On appeal to the district court, the board's findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.
(7) An applicant for a position in Utah state government who alleges discriminatory or unfair employment practices in hiring as defined in section
34-35-6, may submit a complaint in writing to the executive secretary who
shall attempt to settle the complaint by conference, conciliation and persuasion. If the applicant remains dissatisfied with the decision reached after
ten working days following the submission of the complaint, the applicant
may submit the complaint in writing to the hearing officer under subsection
(5) and shall thereafter be entitled to the rights of appeal as provided in subsections (5) and (6).
Section 32. Section enacted.
Section 67-19-26, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
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History: C. 1953, 67-19-16, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, § 22; 1983, ch- 332, § 8; 1991,
ch. 204, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added the Subsection (l)(a) and (2Xa) designations and the
subsection designations» .therein; designated
tfae/ormer second[and third sentences of Subsection (5) as Subsections (6) and (7); added
Subsections (l)(b), (1X0, and Subsection (2Kb);
substituted, in Subsection (lXa), Except as
provided in Subsection (b), appointments" for
"Appointments" deleted "but in every case a

minimum of 5 days" following "director" in
Subsection (2)(a)(i); rewrote Subsection (3),
which read T h e director shall validate the examining instruments, consulting with agency
officials a n d outside experts toward this end":
^
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67-19-17. Reappointment of employees not retain*
empt position.
Any career service employee accepting an appointment to an exempt position who is not retained by the appointing officer, unless discharged for cause
as provided by this act or by regulation, shall:
(1) be appointed to any career service position for which the employee
qualifies in a pay grade comparable to the employee's last position in the
career service provided an opening exists; or
(2) be appointed to any lesser career service position tor which the
^employee qualifies pending the opening of a position described in Subsection (1) of this section. The director shall maintain a reappointment register for this purpose and it shall have precedence over other registers.
History: C. 1953, 6/ 1!) Ji, enacUti by L
1979, ch. 139, § 23.
Meaning of "this act". — See nnt<» undpi
same catchline under § 67-19-11.

Cross-References. — Grievance and ap
peals procedure, dismissal of employee, placemerit on reappointment roster at discretion of
board, § 67-19-25.

67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disciplinary action — P r o c e d u r e — Reductions in
force.
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted only to advance
the good of the public interest, and for just causes such as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or
nonfeasance in office.
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex, age, physical
handicap, national origin, religion, political affiliation, or other nonmerit factor including the exercise of rights under this chapter.
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the procedural ami documentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions.
(4) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal
to the department head as provided in Subsection (5).

(5) (a) No career service employee may be demoted or dismissed unless the
department head or designated representative has complied with this
subsection.
(b) The department head or designated representative notifies the employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion.
(c) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have
the reply considered by the department head.
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department
head or designated representative.
(e) Following the hearing, the employee may be dismissed or demoted
if the department head finds adequate cause or reason.
(6) (a) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of
workload, or lack of work are governed by retention rosters established by
the director.
(b) Under those circumstances:
(i) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be
eliminated, subject to review by the director.
(ii) Temporary and probationary employees shall be separated before any career service employee,
(iii) (A) Career service employees shall be separated in the order of
their retention points, the employee with the lowest points to be
discharged first.
(B) Retention points for each career service employee shall be
computed according to rules established by the director allowing
appropriate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in
state government, including any active duty military service fulfilled subsequent to original state appointment,
(iv) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in
force shall be:
(A) placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection 67-19-17(2); and
(B) reappointed without examination to any vacancy for which
the employee is qualified which occurs within one year of the
date of the separation.
(c) (i) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to
the department head for an administrative review.
(ii) The notice of appeal must be submitted within 20 working days
after the employee's receipt of written notification of separation.
(iii) The employee may appeal the decision of the department head
according to the grievance and appeals procedure of this act.
History: C. 1953, 67-19-18, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, § 24; 1983, ch. 332, § 9; 1991,
ch. 204, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, divided former
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1)
through (3); redesignated former Subsections
(2) through (4) as present Subsections (4)
through (6); in Subsection (5), added the Subsection (a) designation and redesignated for-

mer Subsections (a) through (d) as present Subsections (b) through (e); in Subsection (6),
added the (a), (b), (b)(iv)(A) and (B), and (c)(ii)
and (iii) designations, added Subsection
(b)(iii)(A), and redesignated former Subsections (a) through (e) as Subsections (b)(i),
(b)(ii), (bXiiiXB), (b)(iv) and (cXi), respectively;
and made minor stylistic and punctuation
changes throughout the section.

(
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\ mlafion a misdemeanor.

Any person who knowingly violate a piovisiou ni i lira chapter is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, t> t l l ) i l i mm U
1979, ch. 139, § 35.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

67-19-30. Grievance resolution — Jurisdiction.
(1) Employees shall comply with the procedural and jurisdictional requirements of this section, Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act,
and Chapter 19a, Title 67, Grievance and Appeal Procedures, in seeking resolution of grievances.
(2) All grievances based upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression,
including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, commission, or condition shall be governed by Chapter 19a, Title 67, Grievance
and Appeal Procedures, and Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures
Act.
(3) All grievances involving classification or schedule assignment shall be
governed by Section 67-19-31 and are exempt from the procedures of Chapter
46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act.
(4) Altgrievances by applicants for positions in state government involving
an alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice shall be governed by Section 67-19-32 and Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act.
(5) A "grievance" under this chapter is a request for agency action for
purposes of Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act.
History: C. 1953, 67-19-30, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 191, § 3; 1991, ch. 204, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,1991, inserted wGnevance and Appeal Procedures" following Title
67" in Subsections (1) and (2), "are exempt

from the procedures of in Subsection (3), and
made minor stylistic changes throughout the
section
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 191
became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25.

67-19-31. Classification or position schedule assignment
grievances — Procedure.
(1) Upon receipt of a classification or position schedule assignment grievance, the administrator of the Career Service Review Board shall refer the
grievance to the director.
(2) (a) The director shall assign the grievance to a classification panel of
three or more impartial persons trained in state classification procedures.
(b) The classification panel shall determine whether or not the classification assignment was appropriate by applying the statutes, rules, and
procedures adopted by the department that were in effect at the time of
the classification or schedule change.
(c) The classification panel may:
(i) obtain access to previous audits, classification decisions, and
reports;
(ii) request new or additional audits by department or agency personnel analysts; and
(iii) consider new or additional information.
(d) The classification panel may sustain or modify the original decision
or make a new decision.
(e) The classification panel shall report its decision and findings to the
director, who shall notify the grievant.
(3) (a) Either party may appeal the panel's decision to a classification committee appointed by the director.
(b) The director shall appoint a classification committee composed of
three or more department directors representing both large and small
agencies to hear the appeal
(r) The classification comimtt<< ilnill
IV 11K classification unii

ADDENDUM I
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a 1 et. seq. (Supp. 1992)

CHAPTER 19a
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL
PROCEDURES

PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
67-19a-101. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Administrator" means the person employed by the board to assist
in administering personnel policies.
(2) "Board" means the Career Service Review Board created by this
chapter.
(3) "Career service employee",means a person employed in career service as defined in Section 67-19-3.
(4) "Employer" means the state of Utah and all supervisory personnel
vested with the authority to implement and administer the policies of the
department.
(5) "Grievance" means:
(a) a complaint by a career service employee concerning any matter touching upon the relationship between the employee and his
employer; and
(b) any dispute between a career service employee and his employer.
(6) "Supervisor" means the person to whom an employee reports and
who assigns and oversees the employee's work.
History: C. 1953, 67-!9a-101, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 6; 1991, ch. 101, § 2; 1991,
ch. 204, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment by ch. 101, effective April 29,1991, added
present Subsection (3); designated former Subsections (3) to (5) as present Subsections (4) to
(6); and substituted "the policies of the departmem" for "the state's personnel policies" at the
end of present Subsection (4).

The 1991 amendment by ch 204, effective
April 29, 1991, substituted "a career service"
for "an" in present Subsections (5Ha) and
(5Kb),
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 2
•CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
67-19a-201. Career Service Review Board created — Members — Appointment — Removal — Terms — Organization — Compensation.
(1) There is created a Career Service Review Board.
(2) (a) The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appointfivemembers to the board no more than three of which are members
of the same political party.
(b) The governor shall appoint members whose gender and ethnicity
represent the career service work force.
(c) The governor may remove any board member for cause and appoint
a replacement to complete the unexpired term of the member removed for
cause.
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(a) are qualified by knowledge of employee relations and merit system
principles in public employment; and
(b) are not:
(i) members of any local, state, or national committee of a political
party;
(ii) officers or members of a committee in any partisan political
club; and
(iii) holding or a candidate for a paid public office.
(4) (a) The governor shall appoint board members to serve four-year terms
as follows:
(i) three members shall be appointed to a term beginning and ending with the governor's term; and
(ii) two members shall be appointed to four-year terms beginning
January 1 of the third year of the governor's regular term in office.
(b) The members of the board shall serve until their successors are
appointed and qualified.
(c) Persons serving on the board as of the effective date of this act may
complete the term for which they were appointed.
(d) If a vacancy occurs on the board, the governor may appoint a new
person to fill the unexpired term.
(5) Each year, the board shall choose a chairman and vice-chairman from
its own members.
(6) (a) Three members of the board are a quorum for the transaction of
business.
(b) Action by a majority of members when a quorum is present is action
of the board.
(7) Members of the board shall serve without compensation, but they may
be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties
as established by the Division of Finance.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-201. enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 7.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1969, ch. 191 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-202. Powers — Jurisdiction.
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final administrative body to review
appeals from career service employees and agencies of decisions about
promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands,
wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position that have not been resolved at an earlier
stage in the grievance procedure.
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other personnel matters.
(2) The time limits established in this chapter supersede the procedural
time limits established in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act.
(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other proceeding, any member of the board may:
(a) administer oaths;
(b) certify official acts;
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence; and
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-202, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, * 8; 1991, ch. 101, f 3; 1991,
ch. 204, % 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment by ch. 101, effective April 29,1991, added
Subsection (3)(d), making a related grammatical change, and made a change in the style of
the chapter reference in Subsection (2).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective
April 29,1991, inserted "career service" before

"employees" in Subsection (lKa), and "Administrative Procedures Act" after Title 63" in
Subsection (2).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

The board may make rules governing:
(1) definitions of terms, phrases, and words used in the grievance process established by this chapter;
(2) what matters constitute excusable neglect for purposes of the
waiver of time limits established by this chapter;
(3) the application for and service of subpoenas, the service and filing
of pleadings, and the issuance of rulings, orders, determinations, summary judgments, transcripts, and other legal documents necessary in
grievance proceedings;
(4) the use, calling, attendance, participation, and fees of witnesses in
grievance proceedings;
(5) continuances of grievance proceedings;
(6) procedures in jurisdictional and evidentiary hearings, unless governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act;
(7) the presence of media representatives at grievance proceedings; and
(8) procedures for sealing files or making data pertaining to a grievance unavailable to the public.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-203, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 9.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-204. Administrator — Powers.
(1) The board shall employ a person with demonstrated ability to administer personnel policies to assist it in performing the functions specified in this
chapter.
(2) (a) The administrator may:
(i) assign qualified, impartial hearing officers on a per case basis to
adjudicate matters under the jurisdiction of the board;
(ii) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence in conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other proceeding;
and
(iii) upon motion made by a party or person to whom the subpoena
is directed and upon notice to the party who issued the subpoena,
quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable, requires an excessive number of witnesses, or requests evidence not relevant to any
matter in issue.
(b) In selecting and assigning hearing officers under authority of this
section, the administrator shall appoint hearing officers that have demonstrated by education, training, and experience the ability to adjudicate
and resolve personnel administration disputes by applying employee relations principles within a large, public work force.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-204, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, f 10; 1991, ch. 101, 6 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment. effective April 29, 1991, added Subsection (2)iaKiii; and made related changes.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989. ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1969. pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 3
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES
67-19a-301. Charges submissible under grievance and appeals procedure.
(1) This grievance procedure may only be used by career service employees
who are not:
(a) public applicants for a position with the state's work force;
(b) public employees of the state's political subdivisions;
(c) public employees covered by other grievance procedures; or
(d) employees of state institutions of higher education.
(2) Whenever a question or dispute exists as to whether an employee is
qualified to use this grievance procedure, the administrator shall resolve the
question or dispute. The administrator's decision is reviewable only by the
Court of Appeals.
(3) Any career service employee may submit a grievance based upon a
claim or charge of injustice or oppression, including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, omission, or condition for solution
through the grievance procedures set forth in this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 67.198-301, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 11; 1991, ch. 101, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991f added Subsections (1) and (2) and designated the former section as Subsection (3).

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-302. Levels of appealability of charges submissible
under grievance and appeals procedure.
( D A career service employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel
rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions
in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position to all levels of
grievance procedure.
(2) (a) A career service employee may grieve all other matters only to the
level of his department head.
(b) The decision of the department head is final and unappealable to
the board.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-302, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 12; 1991, ch. 204, { 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "A
career service" for "An aggrieved" in Subsection (1).

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-303. Employees9 rights in grievance and appeals
procedure.
(1) For the purpose of processing a grievance, a career service employee
may:
(a) obtain assistance by a representative of the employee's choice to act
as an advocate at any level of the grievance procedure;
(b) request a reasonable amount of time during work hours to confer
with the representative and prepare the grievance; and
(c) call other employees as witnesses at a grievance hearing.
(2) The state shall allow employees to attend and testify at the grievance
hearing as witnesses if the employee has given reasonable advance notice to
his immediate supervisor.
(3) No person may take any reprisals against any career service employee
for use of grievance procedures specified in this chapter.

(4) (a) The employing agency of an employee who files a grievance may not
place grievance forms, grievance materials, correspondence about the
grievance, agency and department replies to the grievance, or other documents relating to the grievance in the employee's personnel file.
(b) The employing agency of an employee who files a grievance may
place records of disciplinary action in the employee's personnel file.
(c) If any disciplinary action against an employee is rescinded through
the grievance procedures established in this chapter, the agency and the
Department of Human Resource Management shall remove the record of
the disciplinary action from the employee's agency personnel file and
central personnel file.
(d) An agency may maintain a separate grievance file relating to an
employee's grievance, but shall discard the file after three years.
History: C. 1953, 67.19a303, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 13; 1991, ch. 204, § 10.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "a
career service*' for "an" in Subsection (1).

Effective Datea. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25.

PART 4
PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY
AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE
67-19a-401. Time limits for submission of appeal by aggrieved employee — Voluntary termination of
employment — Group grievances.
(1) Subject to the standing requirements contained in Part 3 and the restrictions contained in this part, a career service employee may have a grievance addressed by following the procedures specified in this part.
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grievance is directed may
agree in writing to waive or extend grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time limits
specified for those grievance steps, as outlined in Section 67-19a-402.
(3) Any writing made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be submitted to the
administrator.
(4) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the
next step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived
his right to process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the grievance.
(b) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the
next step within the time limits established in this part, the grievance is
considered to be settled based on the decision made at the last step.
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, an employee may submit a grievance for review under this chapter only if the employee submits the grievance:
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the grievance; or
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge of
the event giving rise to the grievance,
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (4)(a), an employee may not submit a
grievance more than one year after the event giving rise to the grievance.
(6) A person who has voluntarily terminated his employment with the state
may not submit a grievance after he has terminated his employment.
(7) (a) When several employees allege the same grievance, they may submit a group grievance by following the procedures and requirements of
this chapter.

sign the complaint.
(c) The administrator and board may not treat a group grievance as a
class action, but may select one aggrieved employee's grievance and address that grievance as a test case.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-401, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 14; 1991, ch. 101, § 6;
1991, ch. 204, I 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment by ch. 101, effective April 29, 1991, subsututed "grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time
limits specified for those grievance steps, as
outlined in Section 67-19a-402" for "any grievance step or the time limits specified for any
grievance step" at the end of Subsection (2);
added present Subsection (3); and redesignated

former Subsections (3) to (6) as present Subeections (4) to (7).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective
April 29, 1991, substituted "a career service"
for "an aggrieved" in Subsection (1).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-402. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved
employee.
(1) (a) A career service employee who believes he has a grievance shall
attempt to resolve the grievance through discussion with his supervisor.
(b) Within five days after the employee discusses the grievance with
him, the employee's supervisor may issue a verbal decision on the grievance.
(2) (a) If the grievance remains unanswered for five working days after its
submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the supervisor's verbal decision, the employee may resubmit the grievance in writing
to his immediate supervisor within five working days after the expiration
of the period for response or receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is
submitted, the employee's supervisor shall issue a written response to the
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision.
(c) Immediately after submitting the written grievance to his supervisor, the employee shall notify the administrator of the board that he has
submitted the written grievance.
(3) (a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's supervisor remains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the
aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee
may submit the grievance in writing to his agency or division director
within ten working days after the expiration of the period for decision or
receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is
submitted, the employee's agency or division director shall issue a written
response to the grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the
decision.
(4) (a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's agency or division director remains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued,
the employee may submit the grievance in writing to his department
head within ten working days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
(b) Within ten working days after the employee's written grievance is
submitted, the department head shall issue a written response to the
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision.
(c) The decision of the department head is final in all matters except
those matters that the board may review under the authority of Part 3.
(5) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's department head
meets the subject matter requirements of Section 67-19a-302 and if the grievance remains unanswered for ten working days after its submission, or if the
aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee may
submit the grievance in writing to the administrator within ten working days
after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first.

67-19a-403. Appeal to administrator — uunsaiuuuum
hearing.
(1) At any time after a career service employee submits a grievance to the
administrator under the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator
may attempt to settle the grievance informally by conference, conciliation,
and persuasion with the employee and the agency.
(2) (a) When an employee submits a grievance to the administrator under
the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator shall determine:
(i) whether or not the employee is a career service employee and is
entitled to use the grievance system;
(ii) whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the grievance;
(iii) whether or not the employee has been directly harmed; and
(iv) the issues to be heard,
(b) In order to make the determinations required by Subsection (2), the
administrator may:
(i) hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may present
oral arguments, written arguments, or both; or
(ii) conduct an administrative review of the file.
(3) (a) If the administrator holds a jurisdictional hearing, he shall issue his
written decision within 15 days after the hearing is adjourned.
(b) If the administrator chooses to conduct an administrative review of
the file, he shall issue his written decision within 15 days after he receives the grievance.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-403, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 16; 1991, ch. 204, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added present
Subsection (2)(a)(i) and redesignated former

Subsections (2>(aKi> through (2>(aKiii) as
present Subsections (2HaKii) through (2Kahiv).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-4Q4. Administrator's responsibilities.
If the administrator determines that the grievance meets the jurisdictional
requirements of Part 3, he shall:
(1) appoint a hearing officer to adjudicate the complaint; and
(2) set a date for the hearing that is either:
(a) not later than 30 days after the date the administrator issues
his decision that the board has jurisdiction over the grievance; or
(b) at a date agreed upon by the parties and the administrator.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-404, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 17.
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-

67-19a-405. Prehearing conference.
(1) The administrator may require the presence of each party, the representatives of each party, and other designated persons at a prehearing conference.
(2) At the conference, the administrator may require the parties to:
(a) identify which allegations are admitted and which allegations are
denied,
(b) submit a joint statement detailing:
(i) stipulated facts that are not in dispute;
(ii) the issues to be decided; and
(iii) applicable laws and rules;
(c) submit a list of witnesses, exhibits, and papers or other evidence
that each party intends to offer as evidence; and
(d) confer in an effort to resolve or settle the grievance.
(3) At the conclusion of the prehearing conference, the administrator may
require the parties to prepare a written statement identifying:
(a) the items presented or agreed to under Subsection (2); and
(b) the issues remaining to be resolved by the hearing process.
(4) The prehearing conference is informal and is not open to the public or
press.

67-19a-406. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved
employee — Hearing before hearing officer —
Evidentiary and procedural rules.
(1) (a) The administrator shall employ a certified court reporter to record
the hearing and prepare an official transcript of the hearing.
(b) The official transcript of the proceedings and all exhibits, briefs,
motions, and pleadings received by the hearing officer are the official
record of the proceeding.
(2) (a) The agency has the burden of proof in all grievances resulting from
dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, reductions in
force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position.
(b) The employee has the burden of proof in all other grievances.
(c) The party with the burden of proof must prove their case by substantial evidence.
(3) (a) The hearing officer shall issue a written decision within 20 working
days after the hearing is adjourned.
(b) If the hearing officer does not issue a decision within 20 working
days, the agency that is a party to the grievance is not liable for any
claimed back wages or benefits after the date the decision is due.
(4) The hearing officer may:
(a) not award attorneys' fees or costs to either party;
(b) close a hearing by complying with the procedures and requirements
of Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act;
(c) seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if the evidence raises questions about an employee's character, professional competence, or physical or mental health;
(d) grant continuances according to board rule; and
(e) decide questions or disputes concerning standing in accordance with
Section 67-19a-301.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-406, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, f 19; 1991, ch. 101, § 7.
Axnendxnent Notes. — The 1991 amendmerit, effective April 29, 1991, inserted the
subdivision designation "(a)" in Subsection (4);
designated former Subsections (5) and (6) as
present Subsections (4Kb) and (4)tc); added

Subsections (4 Hd) and (4)(e); and made stylistic
changes and appropriate changes in phraseology.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 hecame effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const. Art. VI Sec. 25.

67-19a-407. Appeal to Career Service Review Board.
(1) (a) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on a grievance to the board if:
(i) the appealing party files a notice of appeal with the administrator within ten working days after the receipt of the decision or the
expiration of the period for decision, whichever is first; and
(ii) the appealing party meets the requirements for appeal established in Subsection (2).
(b) The appealing party shall submit a copy of the official transcript of
the hearing to the administrator.
(2) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on
a grievance to the board only if the appealing party alleges that:
(a) the hearing officer did not issue a decision within 20 working days
after the hearing adjourned;
(b) the appealing party is dissatisfied with the decision;
(c) the appealing party believes that the decision was based upon an
incorrect or arbitrary interpretation of the facts; or
(d) the appealing party believes that the hearing officer made an erroneous conclusion of law.
History: C. 1953, 67»19a-407, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
L. 1989, ch. 191, I 90.
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 he-

67-19a-408. Career Service Review Board hearing — Evidentiary and procedural rules.
(1) The board shall:
(a) hold a hearing to review the hearing officer's decision not later than
30 days after it receives the official transcript and the briefs;
(b) review the decision of the hearing officer by considering the official
record of that hearing and the briefs of the parties; and
(c) issue its written decision addressing the hearing officer's decision
within 40 working days after the record for its proceeding is closed.
(2) In addition to whatever other remedy the board grants, it may order
that the employee be placed on the reappointment roster provided for by
Section 67-19-17 for assignment to another agency.
(3) If the board does not issue its written decision within 40 working days
after closing the record, the agency that is a party to the grievance is not
liable for any claimed back wages or benefits after the date the decision is due.
(4) The board may not award attorneys' fees or costs to either party.
(5) The board may close a hearing by complying with the procedures and
requirements of Title 52, Chapter 4, the Open and Public Meetings Act.
(6) The board may seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if
the evidence raises questions about an employee's character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-408, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, $ 21.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 191 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

ADDENDUM J
Utah Code Ann. § 6 4 - 1 3 - 2 8 ( 1 )

(1993)

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — STATE PRISON

64-13-29

64-13-27. Records — Access.
(1) (a) The Law Enforcement and Technical Services Division of the Department of Public Safety, county attorneys' offices, and state and local
law enforcement agencies shall furnish to the department upon request a
copy of records of any person arrested in this state.
(b) The department shall maintain centralized files on all offenders
under the jurisdiction of the department and make the files available for
review by other criminal justice agencies upon request in cases where
offenders are the subject of active investigations.
(2) All records maintained by programs under contract to the department
providing services to public offenders are the property of the department.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-27, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 22; 1987, ch. 116, § 20; 1989,
ch. 224, § 3; 1993, ch. 234, $ 374.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 211, § 22 repeals former fe 64-13-27, as enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 27, relating to
vacancy in office of warden, and enacts the
above section.
Amendment Notes. - T h e 1989 amend» 5 ! ^ ^ ^
first and second sentences of Subsection (1) as
Subsections (l)(a) and (b) and, in Subsection
(2), deleted "and shall be returned to it when
the offender is'ter^nated"
fro^Tthe^rogr'am"

at the end of the present provision and a second
sentence that read T h e department shall
maintain an accurate audit record of information provided to other programs or agencies reg a r ding offenders under its jurisdiction."
T h e 1 9 9 3 amendment, effective July 1,1993,
8 u b s t i t u t e d "Law Enforcement and Technical
Services Division of the Department of Public
S a f e t „ for . , g t a t e B u r e a u o f C r i m i n a l I d e n t i f i .
cation" in Subsection (IK.).
Cross-References. — Law Enforcement
, _ , . _0
_.Al ._ _, x
a nnd Technical Services, Title 53, Chapter 5.
* Technical Services, Title 53 Chapter 5.
Government records, Title 63, Chapter 2.

64-13-28. Hearings involving staff or offenders.
(1) The department shall maintain an administrative hearing office to conduct hearings regarding offenders in the custody of the department, issues
involving staff, or any other administrative matters as assigned by the executive director of the Department of Corrections. The hearing officer may issue
subpoenas, compel attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and other documents, administer oaths, and take testimony under oath.
(2) The hearing officer shall maintain a summary record of all hearings and
provide timely written notice to participants of the decision and the reasons
for the decision.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-28, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 23; 1987, ch. 116, $ 21; 1988,
ch. 191, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985,

ch. 211, § 23 repeals former S 64-13-28, as enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, ft 28, relating to
interference with prison activities, and enacts
the above section.

64-13-29. Violation of parole or probation — Detention —
Hearing.
(1) The department shall ensure that the court is notified of violations of
the terms and conditions of probation in the case of probationers under the
department's supervision, or the Board of Pardons in the case of parolees
under the department's supervision. In cases where the department desires to
detain an offender alleged to have violated his parole or probation and where
it is unlikely that the Board of Pardons or court will conduct a hearing within
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
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Board of
State of
of State
State of

State Lands and Forestry,
Utah; Director, Division
Lands and Forestry,
Utah,
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Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
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E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs
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City, for intervenor Chevron Pipeline Company

DURHAM, Justice;
This is an appeal from a summary judgment by the
district court upholding an order of the Board of State Lands and
Forestry. We affirm.
On May 28, 1985, the Division of State Lands and
Forestry (the Division) granted Chevron Pipeline Company
(Chevron) an easement across state school trust lands. The
purpose of the easement was to allow Chevron to build a pipeline
to carry slurried phosphate from Vernal, Utah, to Rock Springs,
Wyoming. In 1985, the Utah Public Service Commission prohibited
the'transportation of phosphate by truck, requiring instead that
phosphate be transported by slurry pipeline*
Chevron knew that the pipeline was to be operated as a
common carrier subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC). However, in 1986, Chevron commenced exclusive

operation of the pipeline despite plaintiff Ashley Creek
Phosphate's (ACP) objection that Chevron had not published a
tariff, as required by the Interstate Commerce Act. In 1989,
Chevron complied with an ICC order requiring it to publish rates
for shipment on the pipeline. Later that same year, ACP, the
lessee of Utah school trust lands, and the State brought actions
against Chevron, challenging the reasonableness of the pipeline
rates and alleging antitrust violations. The antitrust suit has
been suspended while the ICC determines whether the Chevron
tariff is reasonable.
In 1992, Chevron sought approval- from the Division to
assign its easement to FS Industries. ACP asked the Division not
to approve the assignment and further asked the Division to
terminate Chevron's easement across state lands on the basis of
Chevron's failure to publish a tariff. Upon receiving the
request to terminate the easement, the Division met with the
parties and decided to approve the assignment rather than
terminate the easement. In response, ACP filed a petition for
consistency review with the Board of State Lands and Forestry
(the Board). After an informal hearing, the Board affirmed the
Division's decision. ACP then filed an action in Utah's Third
District Court for a trial de novo. FS Industries and Chevron
filed motions to intervene, which were granted. The district
court upheld the Board's order and entered summary judgment
against ACP. ACP now appeals, raising the following issues:
(1) whether ACP lacks standing to challenge the district court's
decision approving the assignment of the easement to FS
Industries; (2) whether the district court correctly concluded
that termination of the easement was not mandatory but was within
the discretion of the Division's Director; and (3) whether the
district court considered the best interests of the school trust
lands in its decision not to terminate the easement and to
approve the assignment to FS Industries.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hiaains
v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). On appeal
from summary judgment, we accord the trial court's legal
conclusions no deference but review them for correctness. Malone
v. Parker. 826 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992); Clover v. Snowbird Ski
Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991). When reviewing the
facts supporting the order, we view them in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Baldwin v. Burton.
850 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah 1993). Because this case is a review
of an administrative adjudicative proceeding, we must ensure that
the district court complied with the requirements of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3-4(5) .
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Under UAPA, "[t]he district courts shall have
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-15(1)(a). This section requires that the district
court's review of informal adjudicative proceedings be performed
by holding a new trial rather than by reviewing the informal
record. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). The State argues that where the governing statute grants
discretion to an administrative agency, the standard of review in
a trial de novo of an informal administrative proceeding should
be limited to determining whether the agency's decision was
reasonable in view of the facts presented at the district court.
In other words, the State argues that the district court's de
novo review of an informal proceeding'should defer to the
reasonable exercise of statutorily delegated discretion to the
Division. We disagree.
Instead, we note with approval and adopt the rule
previously used in two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals
establishing the right to a new trial without deference to the
determinations of an informal administrative proceeding. Id. at
452 (fl [D] istrict court does not have discretion to review an
informal adjudicative proceeding by any method other than a trial
de novo, as mandated by UAPA.f!); Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790
P.2d 587, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (finding absolute right to
trial de novo when informal hearing is held under UAPA). This
rule guarantees the district court the opportunity to correct any
deficiencies that may arise because of the informal nature of
administrative proceedings and provides an adequate record for
future review. Cordova. 861 P.2d at 452; see also Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & Forestry. 830 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1992) (finding that formal administrative
proceedings "allow the opportunity for fuller discovery and fact
finding, [and] are more likely to result in an adequate record").
Thus, pursuant to section 63-46b-15(l)(a), review by trial de
novo means a new trial with no deference to the administrative
proceedings below. Accordingly, we examine, without deference,
the district court's legal conclusions and determine whether, on
de novo review, the district court properly granted summary
judgment. See East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan. 860 P.2d
310, 312 (Utah 1993); Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1989) .
STANDING
FS Industries argues that ACP lacks standing to
challenge the Director's decision. When determining questions of
standing, we rely on the factors articulated in Jenkins v. Swan,
675 P.2d 1145, 1150-51 (Utah 1983). Jenkins requires that a
party seeking standing demonstrate only one of the following:
(1) a personal stake in the controversy and some causal
relationship between"the injury, the governmental actions, and
the relief requested; (2) that no other party has a greater
3
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interest ^ in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely
to be raised at all unless the present party has standing to
raise them; or (3) that the issues are of such great public
importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the
public interest. Id.
In this case, ACP has standing under the first Jenkins
criterion. As the lessee of state school trust lands, ACP owns
the right to use the easement through its access to Chevron's
common carrier pipeline. Effective denial of this right would
cause ACP to suffer direct injury because the pipeline represents
the only legal method available to ACP for transporting phosphate
to commercial markets. Therefore, ACP has standing.
TERMINATION OF THE EASEMENT
ACP argues that termination of the easement was
mandatory because Chevron did not immediately publish a tariff
upon commencing operation of the pipeline in 1986. However, even
assuming that Chevron's failure to publish a tariff in 1986 is a
violation of the law, rule 640-40-1700 of the Utah Administrative
Code vests discretion in the Director of the Division to
determine whether the violation justifies termination. This rule
states:
Any easement granted by the Division
across state land may be terminated in whole
or in part for failure to comply with any
term or conditions of the conveyance document
or applicable laws or rules. Upon
determination bv the Director that an
easement is subject to termination pursuant
to the terms of the grant or applicable laws
or rules, the Director shall issue an
appropriate instrument terminating the
easement.
Utah Admin. Code R640-40-1700 (emphasis added). Statutes and
administrative rules should generally be construed according to
their plain language. See Brinkerhoff v. Forsvth. 779 P.2d 685,
686 (Utah 1989). Thus, in reviewing a statute or am
administrative rule, we read each term literally unless such a
reading is unreasonably inoperable or confused. See Morton Int'l
Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991).
The language of this rule is not ambiguous. The rule
clearly states that the Director may, not shall, terminate the
easement for violations of the law. ACP ignores the first
sentence of the rule, focusing instead on the second half of the
second sentence, which states that "the Director shall issue an
appropriate instrument terminating the easement." ACP argues
that this part of the second sentence absolutely requires the
Director to terminate the easement for any violation of the law.
No. 940214
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However, the rule predicates this result on the Director's
"determination" that the easement is terminable. If the Director
had no discretion, the need for a "determination" would be
surplusage. Thus, the plain language of the rule grants
discretion to the Director to determine whether a violation of
the law warrants termination of the easement.
In addition, we note that this construction of the rule
is consistent with good policy and common sense. A requirement
that the Director automatically terminate an easement for every
violation of federal, state, or local law, ordinance, or
regulation would create an administrative nightmare. Under ACP's
interpretation, even the most minor and isolated violation would
require mandatory termination, ACP attempts to address this
problem by arguing that after mandatory termination,
reinstatement of an easement would be possible if reinstatement
were shown to be in the best interests of the trust. Such a
process would be cumbersome and wasteful and does not seem a
plausible construction of the rule. If the Director deems a
violation serious, the Director can terminate the easement under
the discretion granted in rule 640-40-1700. But if the Director
deems a violation to be minor or cured, the Director can exercise
discretion not to terminate the easement. Allowing the Director
the discretion not to terminate the easement for minor or even
cured violations ensures that the Director can act in the best
interests of the trust.
In this case, although Chevron's failure to publish a
tariff in 1986 was arguably a violation of the law, Chevron
complied with a subsequent FCC order to publish rates in 1989.
There is nothing in the record which indicates that ACP had
operational capacity to ship or even mine phosphate in 1989, let
alone in 1986. Thus, the alleged violation appears to have
caused little, if any, injury, and a discretionary response from
the Director seems entirely appropriate. Therefore, this Court
finds that the district court correctly concluded that rule
640-40-1700 grants the Director the discretion to determine
whether a violation warrants termination of the easement. We
note, however, that rule 640-40-1700 dees not grant the Director
unfettered discretion to terminate the easement, because the
Director is always bound to act in the best interests of the
trust. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands &
Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 525 (Utah 1994) (finding that the state
has "irrevocable duty to manage these trust lands for the sole
benefit of the common schools").
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TRUST
An examination of the district court's findings of fact
and conclusions of law establishes that on de novo review the
court considered the best interests of the trust and correctly
concluded not to terminate the easement. In exercising
discretion to terminate the easement, the Director is bound to
5
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act in the best interests of the trust beneficiaries. See
National Parks & Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands, 869
P.2d 909, 916 (Utah 1993) (finding that trustee's duty of loyalty
requires state to act solely for benefit of trust). The Director
must:
(a) seek to maximize trust land revenue,
consistent with the balancing of short and
long-term interests so that long-term
benefits are not lost in an effort to
maximize short-term gains;
(b) maintain integrity of the trust and
prevent misapplication of its lands and
revenues through prudent management; and
(c) make the interest of the school and
institutional trust beneficiaries paramount.
Utah Code Ann. § 65A-l-4(2) (Supp. 1 9 9 5 ) - 1
In sum, in keeping the interests of the trust
paramount, the Division must manage state school trust lands in
the "most prudent and profitable manner possible." Colman v.
Utah State Land Bd.. 403 P.2d 781, 783 (Utah 1965).
ACP argues that the district court failed to consider
the best interests of the trust in concluding not to terminate
the easement. However, the record shows that even though the
district court may not have specifically enumerated the interests
of the trust, it did consider the trust's best interests in
deciding not to terminate the easement. The court's findings of
fact and conclusions of law demonstrate a recognition that trust
lands were involved and an understanding of the nature of the
fiduciary obligations involved. The court stated in its findings
of fact that "the Director had exercised his discretion in a
manner consistent with the rules, and statutes and that the
decision was consistent with the best interests of the trust
beneficiaries." The court also stated in its conclusions of law
that in exercising trust duties, the State must maximize trust
land revenue in a manner "that would serve the best interest of
the beneficiaries within the provisions of applicable law."

1

Effective July 1, 1994, the State Lands Act, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 65A-1-1 to -10 (Supp. 1995), and the School and
Institutional Trust Lands Management Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 53C-1-101 to -306 (Supp. 1995), were amended in part to place
management authority for school and institutional trust land
assets under the provisions of the School and Institutional Trust
Lands Management Act.
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The district court correctly concluded that termination
of the easement before the ICC has adjudicated the reasonableness
of the tariff would not benefit the school trust lands. ACP,
however, argues that terminating the easement will benefit the
trust and posits the following reasoning: More money is in the
best interests of the trust; the trust is not acquiring more
money because ACP's mine is not operating; ACP's mine is not
operating because the rates are unreasonably high; if the"
easement is terminated, the tariffs will have to be lowered;
therefore, the easement must be terminated until a lower tariff
is set; and by lowering the tariff, ACP will begin mining and
start shipping phosphate across the pipeline and paying royalties
to the trust. This argument is flawed because it begins and ends
with the assumption that rates are unreasonable, which is a
determination that belongs exclusively to the ICC and has not yet
been made. See Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick
& Tile Co.. 450 U.S. 311, 318 (1981); see also Burlington
Northern. Inc. v. United States. 459 U.S. 131, 141 (1982)
(finding that "primary jurisdiction to determine the
reasonableness of rates lies with the [ICC]").
In view of the fact that the ICC has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of this tariff and
is currently in the process of doing so, it is not in the best
interests of the trust for this court to terminate the easement,
thereby circumventing those proceedings and forcing FS Industries
to close its mine. Such action by the court could subject the
trust to potentially expensive litigation with Chevron and FS
Industries if the ICC eventually upholds the reasonableness of
the proposed tariff, and furthermore, it is not clear that
terminating the easement"will provide any benefit to the trust.2
For instance, even if this court were to terminate the easement,
the State does not have the authority to set specific rates that
would allow ACP to mine and ship phosphate. And if the State.
were to take the further step of terminating and then reissuing
the easement conditioned upon providing fair access to ACP, the
determination of "fair access" would still be in the exclusive
jurisdiction of the ICC. See Maislin Indus.. U.S., Inc. v.
Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 119 (1990) (finding that "ICC
has primary responsibility for determining whether a rate or
practice is reasonable").
Conversely, if the court does not terminate the
easement and the ICC eventually determines that the rates are
unreasonable, claims filed by the Division in the current ICC
proceeding and pending antitrust suit protect the interests of
the trust's beneficiaries. Finally, by approving the assignment
2

In addition, if the ICC determines that the rates which
Chevron published and FS Industries adopted are reasonable, then
the Division might well face a claim for substantial damages
resulting from the closure of the FS mine.
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of the easement from Chevron to FS Industries, the Division is
not precluded from pursuing remedies for damages, through ICC
proceedings or the pending antitrust litigation.
In conclusion, it is not in the best interests of the
trust to terminate the easement because such action would be
inconsistent with the possibility that the ICC may eventually
uphold the reasonableness of the proposed tariffs. Therefore,
the district court correctly concluded that rule 640-40-1700 is
discretionary and that the Director exercised this discretion in
the best interests of the trust. We affirm the judgment of the
district court.

Chief Justice Zimmerman, Justice Howe, and Justice
Russon concur in Justice Durham's opinion.
Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurs in the result.
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